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INTRODUCTION
As signs of climate change increase and fossil fuel sources of
energy rise in long-term price and scarcity, countries are paying
ever more attention to the intersections that exist between energy
and environmental policy. China’s energy/environmental crisis in
particular has received major international attention recently, as
China’s continued growth positions it as a key player in solving
the climate change and energy supply crises of the present and
future. A November 2007 article in The New York Times series
“Choking on Growth: A series of articles and multimedia
examining the human toll, global impact and political challenge of
China’s epic pollution crisis” detailed China’s “energy
conundrum” as a “no-win situation.”1 China is faced with bad and
* J.D. 2009, New York University School of Law; M.P.A., Columbia
University; B.A., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. I would like to
thank the Natural Resources Defense Council’s Beijing Office for providing the
impetus for the paper that became this note, and Barbara Finamore of NRDC and
Professor Stewart of NYU Law for providing invaluable guidance and oversight.
I would also like to thank the staff of the NYU Environmental Law Journal for
their thoughtful revisions and superb editing.
1
Jim Yardley, At Chinese Dams, Problems Rise with Water, N.Y. TIMES,
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worse choices between building huge hydropower dams displacing
millions of people or adding more dirty coal-fired power plants to
meet its burgeoning energy demand.2 In the face of these
unappealing choices, one solution stands out as almost
incontrovertibly good: increasing energy efficiency as an
alternative to increasing energy supply. In addition to addressing
supply challenges, a robust energy efficiency policy brings energy
security, reduced emissions, cost-effectiveness, economic
competitiveness, local job creation, and sustainability.3
The European Union (EU) has been at the vanguard of
passing forward-thinking energy efficiency policies over the past
two decades, although it is still grappling with achieving full
implementation of these policies. More recently, China has also
been active in making energy efficiency a part of its national
energy strategy. However, China has struggled to craft effective
energy efficiency laws and to achieve implementation of these
laws throughout the country. If successful, the potential for
improvements and energy savings in China is tremendous. China
has begun to decouple its GDP and its growth in energy
consumption over the past twenty years,4 but it still uses five times
as much energy as the EU to produce one unit of GDP because its
gains in energy efficiency have not kept pace with its rapid
growth.5 This inefficiency, coupled with the massive continued
Nov. 19, 2007, at A1 (quoting Jonathan Sinton, China program manager at the
International Energy Agency).
2
See id.
3
Commission of the European Communities, Impact Assessment Report for
the Action Plan for Energy Efficiency 3 (Commission Staff Working Document
2006) [hereinafter Working Document for Action Plan], available at
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/action_plan_energy_efficiency/doc/impact_assessmen
t_report_en.pdf; European Commission, Mobilising Public and Private Finance
Towards Global Access to Climate-friendly, Affordable and Secure Energy
Services: The Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund, at 3, COM
(2006) 583 final (Oct. 6, 2006). See also MCKINSEY & CO., REDUCING U.S.
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS: HOW MUCH AT WHAT COST? xiv (2007)
(recognizing energy efficiency as the most cost-effective (actually as a negativecost) option for emissions reductions in the United States).
4
China’s GDP averaged 9.7 percent growth per year while energy
consumption rose 4.6 percent per year from 1980 to 2000. Michael B.
Cummings, Helping the Dragon Leapfrog: A Survey of Chinese Energy Policy
and U.S. Energy Diplomacy at the Crossroads, 36 ENVTL. L. REP. 10526, 10527
(2006) (citing DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH CENTER OF THE STATE COUNCIL,
CHINA’S NATIONAL ENERGY STRATEGY AND POLICY 2000–2020, at 3 (2003)).
5
European Commission, Green Paper on Energy Efficiency, at 6, COM
(2005) 265 final (June 22, 2005) [hereinafter Green Paper]. See also Justin
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growth projected for China in the coming decades, creates
opportunities to save (or waste) vast amounts of energy, depending
on the extent to which China can implement effective energy
efficiency policies.6 The Chinese government has made
considerable progress in enacting new energy policies and in
showing awareness of the energy challenges it faces. However,
most commentators express doubt in the central government’s
ability to implement and follow through on its stated policy goals.7
Experts identify implementation and enforcement of existing laws,
as well as creating better incentives for investment in energy
efficiency, as key goals for making energy efficiency a successful
part of China’s energy future.8
This note seeks to detail the key strategies that the EU has
adopted in the field of energy efficiency, and then to draw lessons
from the EU’s experience that might be helpful as China moves
forward in implementing its own energy efficiency policy. While
the EU still has far to go in achieving its energy efficiency
potential, its fifteen years of experience in crafting and
implementing energy efficiency laws offer some valuable insights
from its successes and persisting challenges. The EU is the focus
of this note not only because of its leadership and voluminous
activity in the field of energy efficiency, but also because its
governmental structure parallels China’s in some instructive ways.

Blood, Note, Energy Production Pollution in China—The Effectiveness of Two
Forms of Chinese Governmental Response to the Problem, 19 COLO. J. INT’L
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 155, 156 (2007). China also lags considerably behind the
U.S. in reducing its energy intensity; the U.S. Energy Information
Administration’s 2008 analysis shows that China uses approximately four times
more energy than the U.S.—whereas the U.S. used 8841 btu/2000 U.S. dollars in
2006, China used 34,931 btu/2000 U.S. dollars (measured by market exchange
rates). See Energy Information Administration, World Energy Intensity (2008),
http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/international/iealf/tablee1g.xls.
6
See, e.g., Cummings, supra note 4, at 10531.
7
See, e.g., id. at 10545; Wang Mingyuan, Issues Related to the
Implementation of China’s Energy Law: Analysis of the Energy Conservation
Law and the Renewable Energy Law as Examples, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 225, 228
(2007); Wang Qingyi, Energy Conservation as Security, CHINA SECURITY,
Summer 2006, at 89, 96–97.
8
See, e.g., Cummings, supra note 4, at 10545; Srini Sitaraman, Regulating
the Belching Dragon: Rule of Law, Politics of Enforcement, and Pollution
Prevention in Post-Mao Industrial China, 18 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
267, 309–11 (explaining that one of China’s critical challenges is that while the
national government sets environmental policy, the local governments are often
unwilling to implement, enforce, and finance these policies).
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That is, the EU’s supranational government oversees an incredibly
diverse range of EU member states, each with national
governments that diverge in priorities and capabilities. Similarly,
China’s national government works with a diverse range of
provincial governments that are in charge of much of the day-today implementation of national laws and policies. Thus, the
lessons learned from the EU’s struggles with balancing
responsibilities between levels of government may help China in
its similar effort. Ideally, this will help “the Dragon [l]eap-frog”
some of the EU’s energy efficiency challenges, a strategy that
Michael Cummings recently suggested will be critical to China’s
success in this area.9
This note focuses on three of the critical challenges facing
China that have also been major components of the EU’s energy
efficiency policy development: implementation, enforcement, and
financing. Part I of the note provides an overview of EU energy
efficiency law and policy. It first summarizes the EU’s lawmaking
institutions and capabilities, and then briefly highlights key aspects
of EU energy efficiency law in each of the major sectors (end-use
electricity, buildings, household appliances and energy-using
products, and industry). Finally, it summarizes some of the EU’s
key goals for future energy efficiency policy. This overview
explicitly focuses on regulation of the electricity sector as opposed
to the transport sector, simply for the purpose of limiting its scope
to a manageable size.10 Part II describes the EU’s process,
progress, and challenges in the implementation of these laws, and
Part III describes the enforcement mechanisms used to achieve
greater implementation. Part IV outlines the major financing tools
that the EU uses to incentivize the adoption of cost-effective
9

See Cummings, supra note 4, at 10531 (“Perhaps as equally important [as
China’s energy law and policy development] will be the policies of other
countries—especially the EU, Japan, and the United States as they relate to
cleaner energy technologies—in helping to shape this [China’s development]
trajectory.”).
10
Energy efficiency in transport is another important goal in both the EU and
China; further research analyzing transferable lessons in this sector would be
worthwhile. But at least one expert has suggested that the appropriate policies for
the transport sector might be somewhat easier to implement, and that “more
problematic for China, the region, and the world is the rapid near-term
development of the Chinese electricity sector.” Cummings, supra note 4, at
10534. Hopefully, many of the lessons in implementation and enforcement
gleaned in this paper will be transferable to the field of transport energy
efficiency though the laws themselves are not covered in detail here.
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energy efficiency measures. Finally, Part V draws on the
similarities and differences between the EU and China to suggest
some ways in which Chinese policy-makers could adapt the
lessons learned from the European energy efficiency experience to
help in the crafting, implementation, enforcement, and financing of
China’s own energy efficiency policy.
While this note’s conclusions are focused on lessons that
China could draw from EU energy efficiency policy, its analysis of
the EU’s experience offers insights applicable to other developed
and developing countries as well. By contextualizing and focusing
primarily on the EU’s successes and struggles with energy
efficiency, and then drawing some broad lessons that could assist
China’s particular situation, this note might lend ideas to policymakers in myriad other countries. These policy-makers can and
should evaluate the EU’s experience and potentially applicable
lessons in the context of their countries’ own political, economic,
and institutional structures.
I. EU ENERGY EFFICIENCY INSTITUTIONS AND LAW
A. The EU’s Governmental Structure
The EU is a community of twenty-seven “Member States”
that have consented to relinquishing some sovereignty to the EU’s
supranational institutions.11 The key institutions in EU lawmaking
and implementation are the European Parliament, the Council of
the European Union, and the European Commission. The
Parliament is made up of members directly elected via national
elections every five years in each Member State.12 In contrast, the
Council is made up of one representative of each Member State,
depending at any given time on the subject matter under
discussion.13 The Parliament and the Council jointly share
legislative responsibilities for passing the laws governing energy
efficiency, and the Parliament has the additional function of
supervising the Commission.14
11

KAREN DAVIES, UNDERSTANDING EUROPEAN UNION LAW 25 (3d ed. 2007).
Id. at 27.
13
Id. at 31–32. For example, if an environmental issue is being discussed by
the Council, typically the environmental minister of each Member State will
attend. Id.
14
Id. at 28–33.
12
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The European Commission is the Community’s civil service.
But, it has more authority than many civil services, with
legislative, administrative, executive, and quasi-judicial
functions.15 It has the important role of initiating draft legislation
sent to the Council. Additionally, the Commission supervises the
implementation of legislation once passed, manages the EU’s
annual budget, and investigates and brings Member States that it
believes to be in violation of EU obligations before the European
Court of Justice.16 The Commission’s Directorate General for
Transportation and Energy is charged with managing laws related
to energy efficiency (and energy policy in general).17 For the most
part, this note focuses on the work of the Commission as the key
authority involved in the post-enactment stages of energy
efficiency law and policy, given the note’s focus on
implementation, enforcement, and financing.
B. The EU’s Lawmaking Framework
Because the EU is a collection of sovereign Member States, it
only has authority to legislate in those areas for which the Member
States have ceded authority to the EU.18 The EU’s current legal
framework19 does not permit the EU to establish an overarching
common energy policy (though the proposed but not yet ratified
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe would allow for a
more comprehensive EU energy policy).20 Thus, actions to
15

Id. at 37.
Id. at 37–39.
17
European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy and Transport,
Mission of the Directorate-General for Energy and Transport, http://ec.europa.eu/
dgs/energy_transport/wcm/mission_dg_tren.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2009).
18
See DAVIES, supra note 11, at 14.
19
The EU’s framework is currently governed by the Treaty on the EU and
the Treaty Establishing the European Communities as amended by the Treaty of
Nice in 2001. Treaty of Nice, Feb. 26, 2001, 2001 O.J. (C 80) 1. Further
references will be made to the most recent consolidated version of the Treaty
establishing the European Community. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty
Establishing the European Community, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 1 [hereinafter EC
Treaty].
20
Itziar Martínez de Alegría Mancisidor et al., European Union’s Renewable
Energy Sources and Energy Efficiency Policy Review: The Spanish Perspective,
13 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REV. 100, 101 & n.7 (2009). Recently,
the future of the Treaty has been thrown even further into doubt, as Ireland failed
to ratify the proposed Treaty of Lisbon in June 2008. However, many European
leaders still express hope that a resolution can be reached that does not declare
the Treaty dead. See Euractiv, EU Treaty: What Next?, July 22, 2008,
16
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promote energy efficiency have developed under other
justifications found in the European Union Treaty (including
external relations, internal market, and the environment), leading
to what some have criticized as a fragmented group of policies.21
Moreover, the EU principle of subsidiarity plays an important
role in the development and implementation of energy efficiency
laws. Subsidiarity is a federalist principle, formally recognized in
the European Union Treaty.22 The principle “provides that
decisions relating to areas where the Community and the Member
States have joint competence to act should be taken at the most
appropriate level, as close to the citizen as possible, providing
there is no loss of effectiveness.”23 In keeping with this principle,
the vast majority of EU energy efficiency laws are in the form of
directives.24 Directives are binding on the Member States as to the
result to be achieved, but leave the choice of methods to the
Member States.25 Generally, the rights and obligations created by
a directive only become effective once incorporated by the
Member States into national law.26 The advantage of directives is
that they provide a far greater degree of flexibility to Member
States in choosing how to best achieve a specific goal than do
regulations (which are fully binding without further legislative
action at the Member State level).27 On the other hand,
enforcement of directives presents some challenges, discussed
infra Part III.

http://www.euractiv.com/en/future-eu/eu-treaty/article-174339.
21
See Martínez et al., supra note 20, at 101 (“[A]ctions related to promote
[renewable energy sources] and [energy efficiency] have developed under
different policies . . . resulting in a lack of transparency for both political
decision makers and industry.”).
22
DAVIES, supra note 11, at 25.
23
Id.
24
The Buildings Directive illustrates its commitment to subsidiarity
explicitly: “general principles providing for a system of energy performance
requirements and its objectives should be established at Community level, but
the detailed implementation should be left to Member States, thus allowing each
Member State to choose the regime which corresponds best to its particular
situation.” Council Directive 2002/91, On the Energy Performance of Buildings,
finding 21, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 65, 66 (EC) [hereinafter Buildings Directive].
25
EC Treaty, supra note 19, art. 249, 2002 O.J. (C 325) at 132.
26
DAVIES, supra note 11, at 50.
27
Id. at 49–50.
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C. Overview of Current EU Energy Efficiency Laws
The first European energy efficiency policy developed in the
wake of the 1973 oil crisis,28 but work on energy efficiency
declined as the crisis abated. It did not begin again in earnest until
environmental concerns over energy consumption surfaced in the
1990s.29 After a series of directives during the 1990s, the
European Commission developed a concrete Action Plan on
energy efficiency for the period 2000–2006 that led to the
promulgation of updated directives on buildings and products.30
Most recently, the EU passed a more comprehensive directive on
energy efficiency, which sets an efficiency goal to be reached by
all Member States and requires each Member State to develop an
action plan outlining how it will achieve it.
On the whole, EU actions have moved from more fragmented,
sector-specific policies in earlier years to more comprehensive
regulations, covering a broader range of products and services.
One commentator has characterized EU energy efficiency policy
as a dual approach of “market pull,” whereby energy efficiency
information is provided to consumers in order to pull the market in
the right direction, and “market push,” whereby minimum
efficiency requirements are enacted to remove energy inefficient
products and services from the market.31 EU laws tend to be
organized by sector, often with these ‘push’ and ‘pull’ mechanisms
at work in each individual sector. The following section provides
an overview of the major EU laws governing energy efficiency,
which are also summarized in Table 1.

28
Véronique Bruggeman, Energy Efficiency as a Criterion for Regulation in
the European Community, 13 EUR. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 140, 140 (2004).
29
See id.
30
Communication from the Commission (EC) No. 14349, Action Plan for
Energy Efficiency: Realising the Potential (Oct. 10, 2006) [hereinafter Action
Plan], available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/06/st14/st14349
.en06.pdf.
31
Bruggeman, supra note 28, at 142.
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TABLE 1. MAJOR EU ENERGY EFFICIENCY LAWS32
Year

Sectoral Focus

Title

2006

Comprehensive

Directive 2006/32/EC on
energy end-use efficiency
and energy services

2005

All products,
potentially

Directive 2005/32/EC
establishing a framework
for the setting of ecodesign requirements for
energy-using products

2004

Cogeneration

Directive 2004/8/EC on the
promotion of cogeneration
based on a useful heat
demand in the internal
energy market

32

Summary of Key
Provisions
Requires Member
States to adopt a
national indicative
(non-binding) target for
energy efficiency of 9
percent savings from
2008 levels by 2016,
and requires Member
States to submit
national action plans
detailing their plans for
achieving the target.
Establishes a
framework under
which the Commission
can regulate any
energy-using products.
Between 2007 and
2008, the Commission
is beginning to adopt
eco-design
requirements in the
form of implementing
directives for fourteen
product groups,
including boilers, water
heaters, consumer
electronics, copying
machines, televisions,
standby modes,
chargers, lighting,
electric motors, and
street lighting.
Requires Member
States to prepare
national assessments of
their potential for high
efficiency cogeneration
and to implement a
system of Guarantees
of Origin to track
electricity produced
from cogeneration.

This table draws from the referenced Directives to create short synopses of
the major laws; each law is discussed in more detail infra Part I(C).
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2003

Energy Taxes

Directive 2003/96/EC on
energy taxation

2003

Manufacturing and
Electricity
Production

Directive 2003/87/EC
establishing a scheme for
greenhouse gas emission
allowance trading within
the Community

2002

Buildings

Directive 2002/91/EC on
the energy performance of
buildings

1992

Domestic
Appliances

Directive 92/75/EEC on
the indication by labeling
and standard product
information of the
consumption of energy and
other resources by
household appliances

1431

Harmonizes Member
State energy taxes to a
specified floor by
requiring minimum
taxes for motor fuels,
gas oil, heating fuels,
and electricity.
Establishes a cap and
trade scheme for
greenhouse gas
emissions, which may
indirectly encourage
energy efficiency
innovations as part of
an emissions reduction
strategy.
Requires each Member
State to develop a
methodology to
calculate the energy
efficiency of buildings
and set standards that
new buildings and
large buildings
undergoing renovation
must meet.
Requires suppliers to
label household
appliances offered for
sale with information
relating to their
consumption of energy.
To date, specific
regulations have been
passed for refrigerators,
freezers, ovens, air
conditioners,
dishwashers, lamps,
washing machines, and
combined washerdriers.

End-use Energy Efficiency
The most recent EU energy efficiency directive also has the
potential to be the most comprehensive, as it aims to achieve
overall national reductions in energy consumption rather than
focusing on particular sectors, as other directives do. Directive
2006/32/EC on energy end-use efficiency and energy services
requires Member States to create national plans for achieving a 9
percent energy efficiency savings by 2016, as measured from
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January 1, 2008.33 The directive applies to supply and distribution
of electricity, gas, heating, and fuels to households, transport, and
industrial consumers.34 Member States are required to establish a
national authority to implement the law and report progress
towards achieving the national target, and are also required to
introduce energy efficiency improvements into their public
sectors.35 To help the Commission track progress, Member States
must establish interim three-year targets as well, and must submit
periodic progress reports to the Commission.36 However, the 9
percent target and all interim targets are explicitly non-binding and
not legally enforceable.37 Thus, while the Directive requires some
public sector leadership and attempts to cajole at least some annual
progress by requiring yearly reports, it imposes no real quantitative
obligations on Member States.38 The directive is therefore more of
a monitoring tool than anything else, especially because it charges
the Commission to produce periodic reports on the success of
achieving national targets and to recommend any additional action
that needs to be taken at the Community level.39

33

Council Directive 2006/32, On Energy End-use Efficiency and Energy
Services, art. 4, 2006 O.J. (L 114) 64, 69 (EC) [hereinafter End-use Energy
Directive].
34
Id. art. 2, at 67.
35
Id. art. 4–6, at 69–70.
36
Id. art. 4, 14, at 69, 72–73.
37
Id., at 65. While there was some debate over whether the national targets
should be binding, and a strong push from Denmark at the Council of the
European Union, ultimately a majority of delegates opposed binding targets,
arguing that the potential for further energy efficiency savings varies too greatly
from one Member State to another to make binding targets equitable. See
Council of the European Union, TTE (Energy) Council, TTE (Energy) Council
on 23 November 2006 Energy Policy for Europe Sustainability of Energy
Production and Consumption: Promoting Energy Efficiency and Renewable
Energy—Adoption of Council Conclusions on the Action Plan on Energy
Efficiency, § II, Doc. 15210/06 (Nov. 16, 2006), available at http://register.
consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/06/st15/st15210.en06.pdf.
38
Other noteworthy foci of the directive include informational reporting
requirements for energy distributors and energy sales companies, reformation of
existing financing and tariff rules surrounding energy efficiency, and Member
State provision of energy audits and advanced energy metering for individual
customers. End-Use Energy Directive, supra note 33, arts. 6–13, at 70–72.
39
Id., art. 14, at 72–73.
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2.

Buildings
Legislation governing the energy efficiency of buildings began
in 1989, with the passage of a directive on construction materials.40
Further legislation passed in the 1990s addressed the regulation of
boilers41 and energy certification requirements for buildings.42 In
2002, the Community passed a more comprehensive buildings
directive, which is now the key law governing the energy
performance of buildings.43
Directive 2002/91/EC on the energy performance of buildings
begins by acknowledging that buildings account for approximately
forty percent of European Union energy consumption and
therefore offer a huge potential for energy efficiency savings.44
The directive first requires Member States to adopt a methodology
to calculate the energy performance of buildings, at a national or
regional level.45 Member States must then set minimum energy
performance requirements for new buildings and renovations on
existing large buildings.46 All necessary national laws, regulations,
and administrative provisions to comply with the directive must be
in place by 2009.47 When fully implemented, the measures in the
directive should supply a savings of around forty million tons of
oil equivalent (Mtoe) through the year 2020.48 After 2009, the
40
Council Directive 89/106, On the Approximation of Laws, Regulations
and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Relating to Construction
Products, 1989 O.J. (L 40) 12 (EEC).
41
Council Directive 92/42, 1992 O.J. (L 167) 17 (EC).
42

Council Directive 93/76, To Limit Carbon Dioxide Emissions by
Improving Energy Efficiency (SAVE), 1993 O.J. (L 237) 28 (EEC).
43

Buildings Directive, supra note 24.
Id. finding 6, 2003 O.J. (L 1) at 65.
45
Id. art. 3, 2003 O.J. (L 1) at 67.
46
Id. art. 6, 2003 O.J. (L 1) at 68. Large buildings are currently defined as
those buildings “with a total useful floor area over 1000 m2.” Id. Member States
are also required to make available to owners, buyers, and tenants energy
performance certificates that detail the energy performance of the building and
include legal standards and benchmarks to allow for comparison. Id. art. 7, 2003
O.J. (L 1) at 68. Finally, the directive also requires that boilers and air
conditioning systems be inspected on a regular basis. Id. art. 8, 2003 O.J. (L 1) at
68.
47
In fact, article 15 calls for full adoption of the directive by January 2006,
Buildings Directive, supra note 24, 2003 O.J. (L 1) at 69, but the Commission
has allowed Member States to apply for an additional period of three years to
fully apply the provisions of the directive. See Action Plan, supra note 30, at 12
n.25.
48
Green Paper, supra note 5, at 19. By way of comparison, total EU
44
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Commission plans to propose an expanded scope for the directive
(possibly including the imposition of requirements on small
building renovations as well as large).49
3.

Domestic Appliance Labeling
One of the EU’s earliest efforts at regulating energy efficiency
was its 1992 passage of Directive 92/75/EEC on product
labeling.50 The directive emphasized the power that accurate and
comparable information provided to consumers can have on their
purchasing choices and sought to capitalize on this potential.51
This directive requires suppliers to label household appliances with
information related to their consumption of energy.52 Specific rules
promulgated under the directive between 1995 and 2003 include
energy labeling requirements for household electric refrigerators
and freezers, electric ovens, dishwashers, lamps, washers, and
dryers.53
The EU’s labeling laws are generally regarded as successful in
promoting the use of more efficient products.54 Unfortunately,
though, efficiency gains from labeling have been more than offset
by steeply rising demand for household appliances. That is,
though individual products are becoming more efficient, the
consumption in the year 2004 was 1745 Mtoe. Commission Annex to the Green
Paper on A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy,
What is at Stake, Working Document, at 7 COM (2006) 105 final (Aug. 3, 2006)
available
at
http://www.energy.eu/directives/2006_03_08_gp_working_
document_en.pdf.
49
Action Plan, supra note 30, at 12; Green Paper, supra note 5, at 19.
50
Council Directive 92/75, On the Indication by Labelling and Standard
Product Information of the Consumption of Energy and Other Resources by
Household Appliances, 1992 O.J. (L 297) 16 (EEC) [hereinafter Labeling
Directive].
51
Id.
52
Id. art. 2., at 17.
53
See Commission Directive 2003/66/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 170) 10 (EC)
(electric refrigerators and freezers); Commission Directive 2002/40, 2002 O.J. (L
128) 45 (EC) (electric ovens); Commission Directive 2002/31, 2002 O.J. (L 86)
26 (EC) (air conditioners); Commission Directive 1999/9, 1999 O.J. (L 56) 46
(EC) (dishwashers); Commission Directive 98/11, 1998 O.J. (L 71) 1 (EC)
(lamps); Commission Directive 96/60, 1996 O.J. (L 266) 1 (EC) (washer-driers);
Commission Directive 95/13, 1995 O.J. (L 136) 28 (EC) (tumble driers);
Commission Directive 95/12, 1995 O.J. (L 136) 1 (EC) (washing machines).
54
Commission of the European Communities, Report on the Analysis of the
Debate of the Green Paper on Energy Efficiency, Working Document, at 8 COM
(2005) 265 final (May 29, 2006).
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overall rise in household appliance usage has resulted in a net
increase in energy consumption.55 This conundrum suggests that
labeling laws may need to be updated frequently to keep pace with
growing use of appliances, both to ensure that they cover new
appliances and that standards remain sufficiently stringent for
regulated appliances.
4.

Cogeneration (Combined Heat and Power)
In 2004, the EU adopted legislation on cogeneration to
promote its ability to transform the waste of primary energy
generation into usable by-products.56 Cogeneration, also known as
combined heat and power (CHP) is the simultaneous generation in
one process of thermal energy and electrical energy;57 typically,
the thermal heat that would otherwise be wasted in electricity
production is captured and used for heating or cooling. In 1998,
electricity from cogeneration accounted for 11 percent of total
energy production in the EU; it is estimated that if this percentage
were increased to 18 percent, the EU would save around 3 to 4
percent of total gross energy consumption.58
The main
accomplishments of the cogeneration directive are (1) requiring
Member States to create a certification system known as
“guarantees of origin” that ensures the authenticity of electricity
produced from high efficiency cogeneration,59 and (2) the
establishment of EU-wide efficiency standards for cogeneration by
the EU commission.60 Guarantees of origin are electronic
certificates issued from a national body to producers of electricity
from cogeneration, and will allow Member States to directly verify
and track the amount of cogeneration occurring.61 Although the
directive does call for Member States to conduct analyses of the
55

See generally Edgar G. Hertwich, Consumption and the Rebound Effect:
An Industrial Ecology Perspective, J. INDUS. ECOLOGY, Jan. 2005, at 85.
56
Council Directive 2004/8, On the Promotion of Cogeneration Based on a
Useful Heat Demand in the Internal Energy Market, 2004 O.J. (L 52) 50 (EC)
[hereinafter Cogeneration Directive].
57
Id. art. 3, at 53.
58
ASSEMBLY OF EUROPEAN REGIONS, EU LEGISLATION ON ENERGY
EFFICIENCY (2007), available at http://www.aer.eu/index.php?id=1592 (click on
hyperlink for Note on EU energy efficiency policy).
59
Cogeneration Directive, supra note 56, art. 5, at 54.
60
Id. art. 4, at 53–54.
61
Id. art. 5, at 54. These are analogous to renewable energy credits in the
U.S. See infra note 109.
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cogeneration’s potential in their individual countries,62 it has been
criticized for failing to establish any quantitative targets for the
minimum amount of electricity that must come from
cogeneration.63 Since passage of the directive, cogeneration has
risen only from 11 to 13 percent of electricity consumed, and the
Commission acknowledges that more action is necessary in this
area to stimulate further progress.64
5.

Eco-design of Products
In 2005, the EU passed a directive that establishes a
framework for setting eco-design requirements for energy-using
products, with the aim of increasing energy savings from all
consumer products running on electricity.65
The directive
establishes a “framework” that lays out broad goals and then
instructs the Commission to adopt specific regulations through
“implementing measures” that set product-specific energy
efficiency requirements.66 It also requires Member States to
designate a national authority that is responsible for testing and
labeling all products entering the market, and for recalling any
non-compliant products.67
The Commission hoped to adopt eco-design requirements in
the form of implementing directives for fourteen product groups
from 2007 to 2008, including boilers, water heaters, consumer
electronics, copying machines, televisions, standby modes,
chargers, lighting, electric motors, and street lighting.68 Thus far
the Commission has proposed, and Member States have approved,
standards for office, industrial, and street lighting, and for set-top
television boxes.69 These standards were approved by Parliament
62

Cogeneration Directive, supra note 56, art. 6, at 54.
See, e.g., Martínez de Alegría Mancisidor et al., supra note 20, at 104–05.
64
Action Plan, supra note 30, at 14.
65
Council Directive 2005/32, Establishing a Framework for the Setting of
Ecodesign Requirements for Energy-Using Products, 2005 O.J. (L 191) 29 (EC)
[hereinafter Eco-Design Directive].
66
Id., art. 15, at 39–41.
67
Id., arts. 3, 5, at 35–36.
68
Action Plan, supra note 30, at 10.
69
Press Release, European Commission Eco-design Regulatory Committee,
Member States Endorse Commission Proposals to Reduce Electricity
Consumption, IP/08/1419 (Sept. 26, 2008) [hereinafter Eco-design Regulatory
Committee], available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=IP/08/1419.
63
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in early 2009.70 The Commission also introduced a new proposal
in July 2008 to reduce the electricity used in standby mode for a
number of products,71 and reported in fall 2008 that it plans to
propose several more specific implementing measures in the
coming months.72
6.

Indirect and Market Mechanisms
a.

Taxation

While not directly a measure regulating energy efficiency, the
EU’s 2003 Energy Tax Directive is designed in part to achieve
more energy efficiency. The Directive requires Member States to
harmonize their taxes to meet at least a minimum level of taxation
for motor fuels, gas oil, heating fuels, and electricity by 2004.
However, the Directive grants an extended timeline for compliance
to a majority of Member States—it does not require full
compliance until 2010.73 Implementation of these taxes has been
one of the more contentious areas of policy in Europe; countries
have raised diverse concerns including worries about the effects of
the taxes on national competitiveness and about the regressivity of
the taxes.74 Countries have been hesitant to pass any laws to
harmonize taxation levels—no one appears willing to act first in
the absence of commitments from other countries.75

70

Euractive, Parliament paves way for wider eco-design product list, Feb.
18, 2009, http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy-efficiency/parliament-paves-waywider-eco-design-product-list/article-179566.
71
Memorandum, European Commission, Commission’s Proposals to Reduce
Standby Electric Power Consumption, MEMO/08/488 (July 8, 2008), available
at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/488&
format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
72
See Eco-design Regulatory Committee, supra note 69.
73
Council Directive 2003/96, Restructuring the Community Framework for
the Taxation of Energy Products and Electricity, art. 18, 2003 O.J. (L 283) 51,
58–59 (EC). The extended timeline granted to several Member States is likely a
compromise struck in the directive’s drafting, given the contentiousness of
implementation discussed infra.
74
Eric Engle, Ecotaxes and the European Union, 16 EUR. ENERGY & ENVTL.
L. REV. 298, 303 (2007).
75
Engle describes the problem of getting Member States to move forward on
changing their taxation policies as an eco-tax version of the prisoners’ dilemma,
everyone would benefit if action were taken, but no one wants to risk moving
first, having other countries renege, and thus placing their industries at a
competitive disadvantage. Id.
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b.
Emissions Trading for the Power Sector and ElectricityHeavy Industries

Traditionally, the EU has left industrial energy efficiency
policy to the Member States, largely because Member States have
had success in negotiating long-term agreements with major
national industries for voluntary energy efficiency improvements
and in creating energy audit programs.76 However, more recently
the EU implemented a major new law that creates a cap-and-trade
scheme for greenhouse gas emissions from several EU industrial
sectors, including electricity, metal processing, cement, glass,
ceramics, pulp, paper, and board.77 This EU Emissions Trading
Scheme (ETS) covers about 46 percent of total EU CO2 emissions
by imposing emissions caps on around twelve thousand industrial
installations (i.e., facilities).78 While not primarily focusing on
energy efficiency, the scheme should encourage energy efficiency
improvements indirectly by making it more expensive to emit CO2
and therefore more expensive to consume energy. However, some
experts are skeptical of the impact that the EU ETS will have on
energy efficiency improvements, arguing that the indirect incentive
created is likely to be only minor given the design of the scheme.79
7.

Complementary Actions Towards Implementation
The EU is not reliant on regulation alone to achieve further
energy efficiency gains; it has a range of complementary tools to
help achieve its goals.80 These tools include voluntary agreements
with industry, provision of information to consumers, and a
76
PAOLO BERTOLDI ET AL., COMBINING LONG TERM AGREEMENTS WITH
EMISSIONS TRADING: AN OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT EU ENERGY EFFICIENCY
POLICIES FOR THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR AND A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW INDUSTRIAL
EFFICIENCY POLICY 1 (2007), available at http://www.energyagency.at/publ/pdf/
papier03.pdf.
77
Council Directive 2003/87, Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas
Emission Allowance Trading within the Community, art. 1, Annex I, 2003 O.J.
(L 275) 32, 34, 42 (EC). Annex I of the Directive lists the exact industrial
processes covered and specific exemptions available for small firms and
experimental processes. Id. at 42.
78
PAOLO BERTOLDI ET AL., WILL EMISSION TRADING PROMOTE END-USE
ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLE ENERGY PROJECTS? ACEEE SUMMER
STUDY ON ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN INDUSTRY 1 (2005), available at
http://re.jrc.ec.europa.eu/energyefficiency/pdf/publications/ACEEE%202005%2
0paper%2014%20final.pdf.
79
See, e.g., id. at 1–5.
80
Working Document for Action Plan, supra note 3, at 15.
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Commission-run support program to help Member States achieve
the ambitious goals the EU has set.81
The Commission’s primary support program for helping
Member States and regional authorities to implement energy
efficiency programs and projects is Intelligent Energy-Europe
(IEE). The program is now in its second phase and will run from
2007 to 2013. IEE’s stated goal is to “speed up efforts to achieve
the objectives in the field of sustainable energy.”82 To this end it
funds a wide variety of projects that improve energy efficiency in
buildings, industry, and appliances.83 The EU also has established
a voluntary office equipment labeling program known as Energy
Star, created through an agreement with the United States. Under
the program, office equipment manufacturers can apply to the
Commission for an Energy Star logo to be placed on qualifying
efficient office equipment.84 Similarly, the EU has run a
successful GreenLight program since 2000 for voluntary actions in
energy efficiency lighting. There are currently around 190
organizations participating in GreenLight, contributing a total
savings of approximately 100 GWh/year through installing more
energy-efficient lighting in their facilities.85
These complementary measures are excellent in providing
short-term solutions, often with significant participation, that help
to fill the time lag in implementation of EU directives.86 However,
the Commission reports that the track record on voluntary
81

See, e.g., Action Plan, supra note 30.
Europa, Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme,
http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/n26104.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2009).
83
See generally Intelligent Energy Europe, European Commission,
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/intelligent/index_en.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2007).
Initiatives include more detailed projects (e.g. improving the energy performance
of schools), and broader capacity-building projects at the Member State level.
The most prominent example of this type of program is “Implementing EU
Appliance Policy in Central and Eastern Europe,” which helps to put EU energy
efficiency policies into place in the newer EU states by training national experts,
putting forth templates for national plans, and facilitating exchange of best
practices. See Intelligent Energy Executive Agency, European Commission,
Energy Efficient Equipment and Products 8 (Dec. 2006), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/intelligent/library/doc/ka_reports/equipment.pdf.
84
Council Regulation 2422/2001, art. 5, 2001 O.J. (L 332) 1, 3 (EC).
85
Paolo Bertoldi & Calin Ciugudeanu, European Commission, Five-year
Assessment of the European GreenLight Programme, 1, 6, available at
http://re.jrc.ec.europa.eu/energyefficiency/pdf/publications/RL6%20Paper%20Gr
eenLight%20final.pdf.
86
Bruggeman, supra note 28, at 141.
82
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agreements is “patchy.”87 This patchiness suggests that while
voluntary programs can act as excellent complements to energy
efficiency laws, they are not a sufficient stand-alone solution, even
in an environmentally conscious community like the EU.
D. Success of Current Policies and Looking Ahead
While the EU has improved and continues to improve its
energy efficiency, it still faces certain difficulties in realizing its
full potential for energy savings. Since 1990, the EU’s energy
intensity (a measure of energy consumed per dollar of GDP
generated) has steadily improved; however, it has not improved
enough to counter the rise in GDP during the same period.88 The
consequence is that final energy consumption has risen despite
gains in energy efficiency.89 Improvements have also slowed in
recent years compared to early years of policy implementation:
whereas annual gains of 1.4 percent of energy consumed per dollar
GDP were made in the early 1990s, by 2003 these gains had fallen
to 0.5 percent per year.90 The reasons for this decrease in
improvements include a decrease in energy prices and what has
been termed the “rebound effect”—as energy becomes more
efficient and therefore cheaper, people increase their demand as a
consequence of the falling price, thereby eliminating some or all of
the gains made in energy efficiency.91 More encouragingly,
‘negajoules,’ a measure of the energy saved from energy efficiency
measures, now represent the EU’s single most important energy
resource (calculated by projecting 1971 energy intensity onto
current economic output to reflect what total consumption might
have been absent efficiency improvements).92 Figure 1 compares
negajoules with other major energy sources.93
87

Working Document for Action Plan, supra note 3, at 15.
Draft Report on an Action Plan for Energy Efficiency: Realising the
Potential, EUR. PARL. DOC. (INI 2106) 10 (2007) (Provisional), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/pr/670/670363/
670363en.pdf.
89
Id.
90
Working Document for Action Plan, supra note 3, at 11.
91
HOWARD GELLER & SOPHIE ATTALI, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, THE
EXPERIENCE WITH ENERGY EFFICIENCY POLICIES AND PROGRAMMES IN IEA
COUNTRIES 5 (Aug. 2005).
92
Green Paper, supra note 5, at 11. Essentially, a negajoule represents
energy not consumed because of enhanced energy efficiency. Thus, ‘negajoules’
measure not actual sources of energy, but rather what projected energy
88
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Figure 1. Development of primary energy demand and of “negajoules” in the EU-25

Evaluating the success of any particular energy efficiency
policy is difficult, as gains in efficiency are often inspired by
overlapping policies and incentives at the EU and Member State
levels. Clearly, the broad scope of the EU’s efficiency regulations
helps contribute to their effectiveness. The International Energy
Agency estimated that around 32 percent of current EU electricity
consumption was covered by some type of mandatory energy
efficiency policy as of August 2007, and that planned policies
would raise the coverage to around 62 percent.94 Labeling and
mandatory emissions standards were found to be one of the most
cost-effective methods to meet energy demand.95
While the accomplishments of EU energy efficiency policy to
date deserve praise, politicians and policy-makers throughout
Europe recognize that there is much more to be done on energy
efficiency. The European Commission has recently published a
Green Paper on Energy Efficiency and an Energy Efficiency
Action Plan for the years 2007–2012.96 The Green Paper serves as
a scoping paper in which the Commission identifies issues and
consumption would have been absent investments in energy efficiency. Put
differently, negajoules are a measure of the amount of energy supply the EU
would have needed to construct had energy efficiency measures not been
implemented.
93
Id.
94
MARK ELLIS, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, EXPERIENCE WITH ENERGY
EFFICIENCY REGULATIONS FOR ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 10 (Aug. 2007).
95
Id. at 20.
96
Action Plan, supra note 30; Green Paper, supra note 5.
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solicits feedback, and the Action Plan lays out concrete
Commission priorities in energy efficiency policy for six years.
This Action Plan for 2007–2012 is actually the second Action Plan
for Energy Efficiency; the first plan expired in 2006.
In some ways, there is as much to learn from these planned
priorities as there is from past energy efficiency policy actions.
The Action Plan highlights those areas where past EU energy
efficiency policy has fallen short of expectations and needs further
policy intervention. Even after fifteen years of steadily increasing
energy efficiency policy, the EU calculates that it can save a
further 20 percent of current energy consumption in a costeffective manner, amounting to savings equal to the combined
current energy consumption of Germany and Finland (around 390
million Mtoe) and saving the EU sixty billion euros per year.97
Briefly, some of the key challenges still remaining for the EU
to face on energy efficiency are presented below along with the
solutions proposed in the Commission’s Green Paper and Action
Plan:
1. Challenge: There is a lack of training to create experts and
keep them apprised of the latest energy efficiency
technologies.98
Proposed Solutions: The EU needs to develop a welltrained network of energy efficiency experts and service
providers.99 Energy efficiency training should be included
in vocational training in order to overcome the current
shortage of skilled personnel in the field.100
2. Challenge: Energy efficiency project developers lack
access to adequate financial instruments to fund their
projects. Banks are often reluctant to undertake the
financing of energy efficiency projects, often due to a lack
of technical knowledge, despite the fact that the projects
generally have reliable paybacks.101
Proposed Solutions: The EU should explore the use of
“global loans,” or funds redistributed from banks through a
97
98
99
100
101

Green Paper, supra note 5, at 5.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 14.
Working Document for Action Plan, supra note 3, at 15.
Green Paper, supra note 5, at 12.
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clearinghouse that has some technical and economical
expertise in energy efficiency investments.102 Energy
Service Companies also have a major role to play in
financing energy efficiency improvements and these
companies need more policy support for their activities.103
The EU should work to create further EU-wide financing
mechanisms for energy efficiency, possibly through the
European Investment Bank or the European Regional
Development Fund.104
3. Challenge: Taxes and the current pricing system for
energy do not reflect the consequences of energy
consumption well enough.105
Proposed Solutions: Real-time metering should be
explored as a method to more accurately link energy prices
and full costs of supply.106 At the Community level, there
should be more harmonization of energy tax regimes and
better targeted state aid that helps in energy efficiency
financing.107 The Commission will publish a Green Paper
that examines how indirect taxation could be used to
incentivize energy efficiency.108
4. Challenge: More needs to be done to harness market
forces for energy efficiency to overcome the disincentive
barriers that suppliers typically face, whereby expanding
energy efficiency measures lowers profits. (When the
supplier sells less energy due to increases in efficiency,
profits decline because they are traditionally reflective of
the total amount of energy sold.)
Proposed Solution: The Commission will consider
implementing an EU-wide white certificate system that
would incentivize investment in energy efficiency by
energy suppliers. The scheme would mirror those already
used by Italy and the United Kingdom, requiring suppliers
102

Id. It will be interesting to see how recommendations for expanding capital
available for energy efficiency will fare in the much tighter global economy that
exists today as compared with when the Commission drafted its Action Plan.
103
Id. at 13. These financing issues are discussed more in depth infra Part IV.
104
Id. at 18.
105
Id. at 13–14.
106
Id. at 14.
107
Id. at 17–18.
108
Action Plan, supra note 30, at 17.
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and distributors of electricity to undertake a certain amount
of energy efficiency improvement measures for their final
users or purchase certificates from other suppliers, EUwide, that could make such improvements more
economically.109
5. Challenge: The energy transformation sector is still highly
inefficient—transformation losses currently account for 33
percent of primary EU energy consumption.110
Proposed Solutions: The Commission plans to develop
minimum binding efficiency requirements for new
electricity, heating, and cooling generation units under
twenty MW in size (those not covered by the EU ETS).111
The Commission also plans to propose a new regulatory
framework to promote the connection of decentralized
generation,112 which will reduce transformation losses by
locating electricity sources closer to consumers.
II. IMPLEMENTATION OF EU ENERGY EFFICIENCY LAWS AND POLICY
There is reason to be optimistic about the future of EU energy
efficiency policy given the breadth and depth of its laws and
complementary programs, but as one commentator has aptly put it,
“[r]egulations, however tough, are likely to mean little if Member
States continually fail to implement them.”113 The EU has had a
109
Green Paper, supra note 5, at 25. For a fuller explanation of white
certificates, see infra Part IV(B). These white certificates are roughly analogous
to the renewable energy credits (RECs) being used by many U.S. states to
measure compliance with mandatory renewable energy policies. RECs are
awarded to renewable energy generators and are then purchased by utilities as
proof of compliance with state-level legal obligations to supply a certain
percentage of their electricity from renewable sources. The critical advantage of
using RECs or white certificates is that they can significantly lower compliance
costs for utilities that have to meet certain targets. Costs are lowered by allowing
any utility to simply purchase RECs/certificates from a different supplier, if
another entity can produce renewable energy or energy efficiency improvements
more cheaply. This system also creates a fair, competitive market that equalizes
compliance costs across different geographic or market areas. See, e.g., RYAN
WISER ET AL., LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO
STANDARDS: A FACTUAL INTRODUCTION TO EXPERIENCE FROM THE UNITED
STATES 3–4 (2007).
110
Action Plan, supra note 30, at 13.
111
Id. at 14.
112
Id.
113
PAUL K. LYONS, EU ENERGY POLICIES TOWARDS THE 21ST CENTURY 70
(1998).
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mixed experience with implementation of its energy efficiency
laws: while much progress has been made in improving energy
efficiency across the major sectors, Member States are far from
achieving complete implementation of EU-level laws. The key
implementation challenge is how to induce Member States to
undertake the actions imposed on them at the EU level. The main
mechanism for compelling implementation is the design of the
directives themselves, coupled with the enforcement mechanisms
that will be discussed infra Part III. This section focuses on some
of the key strategies contained within EU-level energy efficiency
laws to prompt implementation of the directives at the EU and
Member State level. While it draws from specific directives for
examples, its primary goal is to highlight the general regulatory
tools that EU law uses to encourage, cajole, and enforce
implementation of its energy efficiency directives.114
A. Commission Responsibilities
One strategy the EU uses to achieve implementation is to write
concrete responsibilities for the Commission directly into the
energy efficiency laws. Namely, the Commission must create
“daughter directives” for some programs, and bears reporting
requirements for almost every program. In particular, the Labeling
Directive and the Eco-Design Directive do not themselves create
specific product standards, but rather require the Commission to
adopt further directives regulating specific products.115 In general,
the Commission appears to achieve full implementation of its tasks
with little enforcement effort; however, delays do occur,
particularly in the implementation of some of its more ambitious
114

This paper constrains its scope to the implementation of EU energy
efficiency laws; however, there is a second level at which energy efficiency
legislation is passed outside of this Community framework, with some Member
States choosing to independently pursue energy efficiency laws that exceed the
scope and often the effectiveness of EU energy efficiency laws. For example, in
its National Action Plan on Energy Efficiency, the United Kingdom reports that
based on its domestic energy efficiency laws, it expects to double the EU-wide
end-use efficiency target of 9 percent by 2016, reaching an 18 percent
improvement in energy efficiency by 2016. See DEP’T FOR ENV’T, FOOD AND
RURAL AFFAIRS, UK ENERGY EFFICIENCY ACTION PLAN, PB 12615, 13 (2007),
available at http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/uk/energy
/pdf/action-plan-2007.pdf.
115
See Eco-Design Directive, supra note 65, art. 15, at 39–41; Labeling
Directive, supra note 50, arts. 10–12, at 18–19.
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timelines.116 The fact that the Commission publishes such
timelines, however, gives Parliament and the Council the ability to
monitor the Commission’s progress and make public any lapses in
implementation—a ‘shaming’ strategy to prompt the Commission
into quicker action.117
B. Member State Implementation
As discussed supra section I(B), the implementation of EU
laws follows the principle of subsidiarity, meaning that overall
objectives are set at the EU level through directives, and
responsibility for implementation falls heavily upon the Member
States. The energy efficiency directives vary in the discrete
implementation tasks that they require of the Member States, but
there are some identifiable common methodologies that the energy
efficiency laws use to encourage full implementation at the
Member State level. This section identifies these common
methodologies that serve as strategies to ensure implementation
and provides examples of these methods in specific directives.
1.

Transposition to National Law
Each energy efficiency directive has a provision for
transposition, whereby the Member States are required to bring
into force the laws, regulations, and administrative provisions
necessary to comply with the directive.118 Each provides a date by
which full transposition must occur and requires Member States to
communicate the adoption of domestic laws fulfilling each
directive’s requirements to the Commission,119 thus enabling easy
tracking of Member States’ compliance status.

116
For example, the Commission has been behind its originally announced
schedule in implementing products standards under the Eco-design Directive.
See infra Part I(C)(5).
117
Notably, the Commission’s lag in implementing the Eco-design Directive
has not gone unnoticed. Parliament recently tried to shame them into faster
implementation, deploring “the severe slippage in the timetable for the adoption
of minimum energy performance standards for priority product groups.” Draft
Report on an Action Plan for Energy Efficiency: Realising the Potential, supra
note 88, at 5.
118
See, e.g., Buildings Directive, supra note 24, art. 15, 2003 O.J. (L 1) at 69;
Labeling Directive, supra note 50, art. 14, at 19.
119
See, e.g., Labeling Directive, supra note 50, art. 14, at 19.
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2.

National Implementing Authorities
In general, the directives leave the choice of implementing
authority to the Member States, but they may enumerate some
specific powers that the implementing authority must be granted.
For example, in the case of the Eco-Design Directive, Member
States may choose an authority responsible for market
surveillance, but they must ensure that whatever ministry,
department, agency, or other body chosen is empowered to
monitor compliance and order recalls of non-compliant
products.120 Similarly, the Cogeneration Directive calls for
Member States to designate a competent body to implement an
accurate and reliable guarantee of origin system to certify that
energy was produced using cogeneration.121
3.

Targets, Methodologies, and Performance Standards
Some of the more concrete obligations placed upon Member
States in many of the energy efficiency directives are the creation
of targets, methodologies for objectively measuring progress of
various actors, and performance standards. For example, the EndUse Energy Efficiency Directive requires each Member State to
submit an Energy Efficiency Action Plan that sets an overall
national target that will achieve 9 percent savings in nine years,
sets an interim target to be established within three years, and
provides “an overview of its strategy for achievement of the
intermediate and overall targets.”122 Further action plans, which
must evaluate progress towards the national target and include
plans for additional measures necessary to meet the targets, are due
after four and seven years.123 The Buildings Directive, while
honoring subsidiarity by recognizing that regional differences may
create a need for varying methodologies, calls for each Member
State to create and apply a methodology at the national or regional
level for calculating the energy performance of buildings.124
Member States must also set minimum energy performance
requirements for buildings.125 Requiring targets, methodologies,
120
121
122
123
124
125

Eco-Design Directive, supra note 65, art. 3, at 35–36.
Cogeneration Directive, supra note 56, art. 5, at 54.
End-use Energy Directive, supra note 33, art. 4, at 69.
Id. art. 14, at 72–73.
Buildings Directive, supra note 24, art. 3, 2003 O.J. (L 1) at 67.
Id. art. 4, 2003 O.J. (L 1) at 67–68.
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and Action Plans at least ensures that Member States are devoting
resources and staff to addressing the directive’s aims, though it
does not ensure full achievement of these aims.
4.

Public Sector Leadership
Given that the EU’s public sector accounts for 5 to 10 percent
of total EU energy consumption, public sector obligations can
make a sizeable dent in cutting overall energy demand.126 Because
public sector obligations are imposed directly on Member State
governments, such obligations are also easier to monitor than
obligations imposed through Member States on private parties.
Thus, public sector requirements are directly imposed in the EndUse Energy Efficiency Directive, which generally requires that
“Member States shall ensure that the public sector fulfils an
exemplary role in the context of this Directive.”127 It goes on to
concretize this obligation by requiring the passage of public
procurement legislation that includes at least two EU-specified
measures.128
5.

Reporting Requirements
Many of the energy efficiency directives also contain reporting
requirements for Member States to make periodic assessments of
their implementation progress. The goals of these reporting
provisions seem to be to encourage information production and to
force at least some action by requiring comprehensive planning
and periodic progress reports, on the assumption that Member
States are unlikely to be willing to report zero progress towards
national goals. For example, while the Cogeneration Directive
does not go so far as to set national targets, it does require that
each Member State take the first step of establishing a national
goal for how much cogeneration it plans to achieve, and then
requires periodic reports (every four years) on progress towards
increasing the share of high-efficiency cogeneration.129 In addition
to requiring each Member State to engage in at least a minimum
amount of national energy efficiency planning, periodic reports are
126

Bruggeman, supra note 28, at 147.
End-use Energy Directive, supra note 33, art. 5, at 69.
128
Id. Member States must choose two activities from a list of EU-approved
activities that is attached to the Directive as an appendix. Id.
129
Cogeneration Directive, supra note 56, art. 6, at 54.
127
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also useful to the Commission as an easy tool by which to track
implementation progress.
C. Implementation: Progress and Challenges
Overall, these implementation strategies are somewhat, but not
fully, effective at inducing Member States to adopt into national
law and execute on a national level the full goals of the EU energy
efficiency directives. The level of implementation varies from
Member State to Member State and from directive to directive, but
more could and should be done to induce better implementation.
One expert has called the Member States’ approach to
implementing EU environmental law “low key and minimalist,”
finding that “in practice, Member States have not been particularly
diligent to ensure that relevant law and practice is aligned with the
environmental obligations entered into by them at EU level.”130
The Commission also recognizes the gap in implementation,
calling for Member States to “go further on implementing and
realizing the full potential of current legislation” and to make “full
use of local and regional Energy Agencies.”131
One of the primary concerns that continues to plague the EU in
implementation of energy efficiency laws is the large divergence
in energy-savings potential and implementation capacity among
countries. Average energy intensity is 60 percent higher in
Southeastern Europe than in Western Europe,132 and the
Southeastern countries lag behind in the development of national
energy policy and particularly in implementing cost-effective
energy efficiency measures.133 One report estimates that efficiency
investments could economically save 30 to 50 percent of energy
consumption in Southeastern Europe.134 The fundamental problem
in many of these countries is a lack of sufficient resources
dedicated to energy efficiency to meet the EU objectives. By way
of illustration, the Czech Energy Agency, responsible for
implementing all energy efficiency measures, has a staff of twenty
130

MARTIN HEDEMANN-ROBINSON, ENFORCEMENT OF EUROPEAN UNION
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: LEGAL ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 5 (2007).
131
Working Document for Action Plan, supra note 3, at 6.
132
Emmanuel Bergasse, What Energy Policy for South East Europe?, PUB.
SERVICE REV.: EUR. UNION, Spring 2003, at 34.
133
See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN ECONOMIES IN
TRANSITION: A POLICY PRIORITY 1 (Dec. 2004).
134
Id.
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and an annual budget of only three million euros; Poland’s
National Energy Conservation Agency has a staff of fewer than
twenty.135 In contrast, the Netherlands Agency for Energy and
Environment has a staff of over 500 and a budget of more than 300
million euros (60 percent of which goes to energy).136
Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy
recently lambasted the progress in the implementation of energy
efficiency legislation in its comments on the new Energy
Efficiency Action Plan: “[f]or the current Action Plan to work,
previous legislation needs to have been implemented effectively.
Nothing could be further from the case.”137 In particular, it found
that the Buildings Directive had been properly transposed by only
five of twenty-five Member States.138 Ten different contributors to
the Debate on the Green Paper for Energy Efficiency commented
that implementation of the Buildings Directive was difficult
because of a lack of expertise in designing and building;139 this
suggests a need for building more competency and capacity in this
area, rather than a lack of will to implement. In contrast, there are
reports that the implementation of the labeling directive, which is
less technically complex, has gone extremely well and saved the
EU twenty-four to thirty terawatt-hours140 of energy consumption
since 1995.141 Savings through 2010 are expected to approximately
double.142

135

Id. at 2.
Id. at 2. This divergence is not explained by the countries’ relative sizes:
the Czech Republic’s population is roughly 10.2 million; the Netherlands’, 16.6
million. See U.S. Census Bureau, International Database, Country Summaries,
http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/summaries.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2009).
137
Draft Report on an Action Plan for Energy Efficiency: Realising the
Potential, supra note 88, at 11.
138
Id. at 5.
139
Analysis of the Debate of the Green Paper on Energy Efficiency, supra
note 54, Annex I, at 37.
140
Twenty-four to thirty terawatt-hours is 24,000,000–30,000,000 MWh. For
reference, a MWh is the equivalent of powering approximately 750 households
for one hour. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DEP’T OF ENERGY: KEY
CHALLENGES REMAIN FOR DEVELOPING AND DEPLOYING ADVANCED ENERGY
TECHNOLOGIES TO MEET FUTURE NEEDS 2 (2006).
141
Paolo Bertoldi & Bogdan Atanasiu, Inst. for Env’t & Sustainability,
European Commission, Electricity Consumption and Efficiency Trends in the
Enlarged European Union—Status Report 2006, 55, EUR 22753 (2007).
142
Id.
136
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Intrinsically tied to the issue of implementation is that of
enforcement—strong enforcement, or a perception that laws will
be stringently enforced, creates more compliance. The EU lacks
the power to directly legislate that the Member States devote more
resources or expertise to energy efficiency, but it does have some
enforcement capabilities that it exercises with regularity in an
attempt to obtain greater implementation of the energy efficiency
laws. This enforcement power is the subject of the next section.
III. ENFORCEMENT
Given the EU’s structure,143 three levels of potential
enforcement authority exist: the EU level, the Member State level,
and the individual level (in national court). In practice, EU energy
efficiency law enforcement is dominated by the EU level. This
section details the procedure by which the EU enforces its energy
efficiency laws, discusses recent and current enforcement actions,
and explores the potential for expanding enforcement capabilities
to the other levels of enforcement authority in order to increase
effectiveness.
A. EU Enforcement Procedure
EU law clearly places an obligation on Member States to
comply with all obligations contained in EU directives.144 In
theory, the Member States should play “a seminal role in the
enforcement area, bearing legal obligations under EU law to
ensure that the Union’s environmental protection legislation is
properly implemented within their respective territories and within
the deadlines foreseen.”145 In practice, Member States are not
particularly diligent in ensuring the adoption and enforcement of
all EU laws.146 Fortunately, given this lack of enforcement action
at the Member State level, the EC Treaty gives the Commission
the authority to investigate and, if necessary, bring before the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) any Member State that it believes
has failed to fulfill its EU obligations.147

143
144
145
146
147

See supra Part I(A).
EC Treaty, supra note 19, art. 10, 2002 O.J. (C 325) at 42.
HEDEMANN-ROBINSON, supra note 130, at 5.
Id.
EC Treaty, supra note 19, art. 226, 2002 O.J. (C 325) at 125.
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Commission enforcement action against a Member State
involves two stages: the administrative stage and the judicial
stage.148 At the administrative stage, enforcement typically begins
as a dialogue whereby the Commission attempts to remedy
breaches informally through consultation and negotiation with
non-compliant Member States.149 If informal negotiations fail, the
Commission issues a Letter of Formal Notice, which defines the
breach it believes the Member State to have committed and
requests compliance within a certain time frame.150 If the breach is
not remedied by the deadline, the Commission then issues a
“reasoned opinion” that sets out the legal arguments for how the
Member State has violated EU law, and allows it reasonable time
to remedy its breach.151
After this deadline, the Commission can commence the
judicial stage of enforcement through bringing action at the ECJ. If
a judgment is won and a Member State still refuses to comply, the
Commission can return to the ECJ and receive permission to levy
fines against the Member State.152 However, few enforcement
proceedings ever reach the judicial stage.153 One reason for the
success of the administrative stage is that when disputes do reach
this stage, ECJ judgments favor Member States over the
Commission in only one in ten cases, and costs are assessed to
Member States when they lose.154 This track record creates a
strong incentive for cooperation with the Commission before
reaching the judicial stage.
The Commission can undertake the procedure described above
to remedy two different types of breaches: non-transposition and
bad application.155 Non-transposition exists when a Member State
fails to adopt national legislation that incorporates an EU Directive
within the deadline set by the directive.156 Bad application is where
148

DAVIES, supra note 11, at 89–90.
Id. at 39.
150
Id. at 89–90.
151
Id. at 90.
152
HEDEMANN-ROBINSON, supra note 130, at 31.
153
Id.
154
DAVIES, supra note 11, at 90. See also, e.g., Case C-342/07, Comm’n v.
Hellenic Republic, 2007 O.J. (C 211) 58, (ordering Greece to pay costs upon a
finding that it did not properly transpose the Buildings Directive).
155
HEDEMANN-ROBINSON, supra note 130, at 40–42.
156
Id. at 41.
149
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a Member State has the appropriate laws in place but fails to
ensure that these laws are being implemented in practice.157 Most
often, the Commission focuses on enforcement of nontransposition simply because this is far easier to detect, given that
Member States are required to report back to the Commission
when they have passed the legislation necessary to transpose a
directive.158 Similarly, the Commission often focuses on
“horizontal bad application,” where a number of Member States
have failed to follow through on a specific commitment under a
law, again usually detectable because of specific timetables for
action set forth in a directive.159 Because the Commission has very
limited investigatory powers, it is difficult for it to detect single
cases of bad application, and it is heavily reliant on complaints
from the public or non-governmental organizations in those
situations where it does bring a case for individual bad
application.160
B. Enforcement of Energy Efficiency Laws
The Commission has been active in its enforcement of energy
efficiency laws in recent years.161 In the past three years, it has
sent around forty-five Reasoned Opinions and Letters of Formal
Notice.162 Table 2 details those enforcement proceedings
undertaken by the Commission since December 2005. During the

157

Id. at 41–42.
Id. at 41, 43.
159
Id. at 42.
160
Id. at 43.
161
It is difficult to know the exact complaints that the Commission has had
against Member States in particular enforcement actions, as the Commission
does not publish Letters of Formal Notice or Reasoned Opinions, judging them
to be confidential litigation documents.
Id. at 196–97. However, the
Commission does publish press releases outlining the formal enforcement
actions that it is undertaking. Id.
162
This number was obtained by searching EU press releases in the field of
energy from December 2005 through October 2008 for news of enforcement
actions, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/searchAction.do. (To obtain the same
search results, input “IP-EC Press Release” into the “Type” field, the date range
specified into the “Date Range” field, and “Energy” into the “Queries” option
under the “Optional Search Criteria” field, and then manually search through
results for press releases relating to the Commission taking legal action against
Member States or issuing reasoned opinions against Member States.)
158
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same period of time, only four cases have been referred to the
European Court of Justice; Table 3 shows these cases.163
The high number of administrative enforcement actions taken,
coupled with the low number of cases actually referred to the
European Court of Justice, suggests that the Commission is quite
successful at enforcing implementation of EU law through its more
informal administrative channels. It is noteworthy, however, that
all of the recent enforcement actions have been for failure to notify
the Commission of transposition or failure to submit National
Energy Efficiency Action Plans by the deadline. Thus, the
Commission has focused its efforts on enforcing the first stage of
EU law implementation—simply having the laws transposed into
Member State law and incorporated into national planning
activities. The Commission’s enforcement actions do not indicate
whether laws that are transposed by Member States are being
effectively implemented on the ground. Given that the
Commission brought 622 infringement cases in the field of energy
and transport in 2005 alone,164 it is unsurprising that it was able to
focus on only those more egregious violations of non-transposition
and not the more fact-specific instances of bad application. This
inability to ensure quality application of transposed laws is an
important shortcoming of EU-level energy efficiency law
enforcement and EU environmental law enforcement in general.165
It is discussed further in the following section in relation to
possible solutions.

163

This number was obtained by searching the judgments of the ECJ in the
field of energy for cases from December 2005 through October 2008, and then
manually sorting through results to find those cases related to the energy
efficiency directives, available at http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/
form.pl?lang=en.
164
23rd Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of Community Law,
EUR. PARL. DOC. (INI 2271) 9 (2005), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0416:FIN:EN:PDF.
165
See HEDEMANN-ROBINSON, supra note 130, at 43.
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TABLE 2. FORMAL ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS TAKEN
BY THE COMMISSION IN THE FIELD OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY
DECEMBER 2005–OCTOBER 2008166
Date

Country

Action

Directive

Reason

Apr-08

Poland

Reasoned
Opinion

Ecodesign
Directive

Apr-08

Greece, Latvia

Reasoned
Opinion

Energy Services
Directive

Feb-08

Finland,
Greece,
Portugal,
Luxembourg
France, Latvia

Reasoned
Opinion

Ecodesign
Directive

Failure to
communicate
transposition
Failure to submit
a National
Energy
Efficiency
Action Plan
Failure to
communicate
transposition

Reasoned
Opinion
Letter of Formal
Notice

Buildings
Directive
End-Use Energy
Efficiency
Directive

Failure to notify
of transposition
Failure to submit
a National
Energy
Efficiency
Action Plan

Referral to Court
of Justice

Buildings
Directive

Insufficient
communication
of the
Directive’s
implementation

Buildings
Directive

Failure to notify
of sufficient

Oct-07
Oct-07

Feb-08

Oct-06

Dec-06

166

Belgium,
Estonia,
France,
Greece,
Hungary,
Latvia,
Luxembourg,
Malta,
Portugal,
Slovakia,
Slovenia,
Sweden
Belgium,
United
Kingdom
Austria,
Belgium,
Czech
Republic,
Finland,
Luxembourg,
The
Netherlands,
Slovak
Republic,
Spain, United
Kingdom
Slovenia

Reasoned
Opinion

Reasoned
Opinion

This table’s information was obtained from http://europa.eu/rapid/
searchAction.do; see supra note 162 for full explanation.
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Feb-06

Jul-06

Letter of Formal
Notice
France

Mar-04
Dec-05
Jun-06

Jun-07

Cyprus,
Greece,
Hungary,
Malta,
Sweden
Greece

Jan-06

Estonia,
Poland
Germany

Jul-05

Dec-05

8/16/2009 5:02:21 PM
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national
implementing
measures
Failure to notify
of transposition
measures

Referral to Court
of Justice
Letter of Formal
Notice
Reasoned
Opinion
Reasoned
Opinion

Taxation of energy
products and
electricity

Buildings
Directive

Failure to notify
of national
implementing
measures

Referral to Court
of Justice
Reasoned
Opinion
Letter of Formal
Notice

Buildings
Directive

Failure to notify
of national
implementing
measures
Failure to
transpose

Reasoned
Opinion

Portugal,
Luxembourg

Referral to Court
of Justice

Luxembourg

Second Reasoned
Opinion

Taxation of energy
products and
electricity

Energy Labeling of
Household
Refrigerators
Energy labeling of
Electrical Ovens
and household airconditioners

Failure to notify
of the national
transposing
measures
Failure to
comply with
legislation
Failure to
comply with
legislation
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TABLE 3. COMMISSION REFERRALS TO EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
IN THE FIELD OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY
DECEMBER 2005–OCTOBER 2008167
Date

Case Number

Defendant

Cause

Holding

May-08

C-187/08

Belgium

Failure to adopt or notify
of adequate national
implementing measures
to comply with Buildings
Directive

Pending

July-07

C-342/07

Greece

Failure to
transpose

Sept.-06

C-388/06

France

Failure to adopt or notify
of adequate laws,
regulations, and
administrative provisions
necessary to comply with
Buildings Directive
Failure to adopt laws
under Taxation of Energy
Products and Electricity
Directive

Sept.-05

C-360/05

Italy

Failure to adopt laws
under Taxation of Energy
Products and Electricity
Directive

Failure to
transpose

Failure to
transpose

C. Potential for Expanding Enforcement
As mentioned in the introduction to this section on
enforcement, enforcement of EU laws actually occurs on three
levels: the EU level, the Member State level, and the individual
level. Given that “the state of political and financial resources
invested in EC environmental law enforcement at [the] national
level leaves a lot to be desired,”168 and the fact that the
Commission reports that it lacks the resources necessary to ensure
full enforcement in the field of energy efficiency,169 private
enforcement actions and citizen suits present a possible but underutilized third avenue of enforcement. In particular, an expansion
167
This table’s information was obtained from http://europa.eu/rapid/
searchAction.do; see supra note 163 for full explanation.
168
See HEDEMANN-ROBINSON, supra note 130, at 159.
169
The Commission estimates that it would need twenty more officials to
ensure full implementation of its new Energy Efficiency Action Plan. Working
Document for Action Plan, supra note 3, at 8 n.13.

WELTON.MACRO.DOC

1458

N.Y.U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

8/16/2009 5:02:21 PM

[Volume 17

of the EU concept of “direct effect,” explained below, might allow
for significant improvements in enforcement of EU laws.
There are fundamental reasons why the Commission should
not be the primary entity responsible for EU energy efficiency law
enforcement, even aside from resource and personnel constraints.
A centralized model of law enforcement has inherent limits,
because a central authority will never practically be able to make
systematic checks on compliance throughout the Union.170 This
makes the EU overly reliant on Member States to supply
information on suspected violations of EU law, obviously creating
a conflict of interest for Member States who are themselves liable
for failing to implement EU laws.171 For this reason, the
Commission makes the plea that “Member States should give the
regional and local authorities to which they entrust (a part of) the
enforcement on the ground of EU or national regulatory measures
the necessary financial and human resources to carry this out in an
effective manner.”172 Other possibilities are to integrate more
investigatory powers into the Commission, or to give these powers
to another entity to which individual citizens could report
suspected violations;173 these reforms, however, still run into some
of the inherent challenges of choosing a centralized enforcement
framework.
Recognizing these difficulties, the European Court of Justice
has been expanding the notion of “direct effect.” Direct effect
allows individuals to sue their Member States, in their national
courts, under rights and obligations created by EU law. This area
of law still has somewhat murky parameters—it is unclear what
directives are to be given direct effect such that individuals can
seek a remedy in national court.174 However, the ECJ has
recognized that those directives that create concrete obligations on
Member States should be enforceable against the States by their
citizens.175 The critical test for whether a particular directive can
be enforced by individuals is “whether the nature, background and
wording of the provision in question are capable of producing
170
171
172
173
174
175

HEDEMANN-ROBINSON, supra note 130, at 162.
Id. at 162–64.
Working Document for Action Plan, supra note 3, at 14.
See HEDEMANN-ROBINSON, supra note 130, at 162–63.
Id. at 221–23.
Case 9/70: Franz Grad v. Finanzamt Traunstein, 1970 E.C.R. 825, 838.
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direct effects in the legal relationships between the addressee of
the act and third parties.”176 In the case of energy efficiency laws,
no directive clearly states that it intends for individuals to have
direct enforcement rights of Member State obligations; thus, it is
an open question whether direct effect could be applicable to any
energy efficiency laws.
Given the Commission’s recognition that it is under-equipped
to deal fully with enforcing energy efficiency laws, it might
consider whether writing in more provisions capable of direct
effect is a politically feasible option. Writing energy efficiency
directives capable of direct effect would allow EU citizens to act
as a second enforcement arm much closer to the on-the-ground
implementation of energy efficiency laws by Member States than
the Commission can practicably be.
For now, granting direct effect remains only a possibility for
achieving fuller enforcement of energy efficiency laws. In the
meantime, the Commission appears to be diligently pursuing
transposition of EU energy efficiency laws and, by quickly
bringing enforcement actions against overdue Member States, has
established that National Energy Efficiency Action Plans should be
taken seriously. Beyond these obvious EU law violations, the
Commission does not act as a police agent to enforce
implementation on the ground, leaving this task to Member States,
who diverge greatly in their enforcement capabilities. While this
makes tracking full and effective implementation of energy
efficiency laws difficult, it also conforms to the principle of
subsidiarity underlying the EU’s governmental structure.
IV. FUNDING AND FINANCING ENERGY EFFICIENCY
One of the major hurdles confronting energy efficiency
projects is that although projects are cost-effective over time, they
require the bulk of funding at their initial stages.177 The financial
sector is often reluctant to finance energy efficiency projects, given

176
Id. at 837. For example, in the case cited, the ECJ held that a directive
aimed at creating a common system of value-added taxes by a specific date could
be enforced by a private citizen to challenge the taxes levied upon him by his
Member State. Id. at 825.
177
INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, SCALING UP ENERGY EFFICIENCY: BRIDGING THE
ACTION
GAP
BACKGROUND
PAPER
5
(2007),
available
at
http://www.iea.org/textbase/work/2007/scalingup/background.pdf.
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their high up-front costs and long payback periods, the small
investments called for by most projects, and a lack of expertise in
financing energy efficiency.178 These barriers persist in spite of
the fact that energy efficiency projects are typically characterized
as low risk and as having good cash flow.179
Recognizing these financial challenges, the EU has developed
a number of funding mechanisms that help energy efficiency
projects overcome their financial hurdles. Yet, even after more
than a decade of experience, the EU still struggles with financing
as one of the largest barriers to more energy efficiency efforts.180
The major strategies used to date to fund energy efficiency can be
loosely grouped into public funding, market-based instruments,
and supporting private financing; experience with each is briefly
discussed below.
A. Public Funding
The EU allocates some funding directly from its budget into
grants for energy efficiency projects, including around 730 million
euros to the Intelligent Energy Europe project discussed supra Part
I(C)(7) and another 430 million euros to an “eco-innovation”
program as part of its Entrepreneurship and Innovation Program.181
These funds are given directly to specific projects, often run by a
conglomeration of government agencies, universities, and in some
cases private organizations.182 The EU also allocates some funds
to energy efficiency technological research through its Seventh
Framework
program
for
research
and
technological
development.183
178

Id.
KLINCKENBERG CONSULTANTS, THE EUROPEAN ALLIANCE OF COMPANIES
FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN BUILDINGS, INVESTING IN BUILDING ENERGY
EFFICIENCY IN THE ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION 1 (2006), available at
http://www.euroace.org/reports.htm (follow “Investing in Building Energy
Efficiency in the Enlarged European Union” hyperlink).
180
Action Plan, supra note 30, at 16.
181
Euractiv, Funding Energy Efficiency in the EU, July 10, 2007,
http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/funding-energy-efficiency-eu/article-165378.
182
See, e.g., INTELLIGENT ENERGY EXECUTIVE AGENCY, EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, MULTIPLYING SUCCESS IN BUILDINGS (2006) (describing all
buildings projects sponsored by Intelligent Energy Europe through 2006),
available at http://www.adene.pt/NR/rdonlyres/4F686BA0-0BE0-438C-8C0E1E52EDA12494/52/Multiplyingsuccessinbuildings21InnovativeProjectss.pdf.
183
Euractiv, supra note 181. The Seventh Framework program is the EU’s
179
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The countries that are most in need of financial assistance for
funding energy efficiency are the recently-added Member States,
many of which are economies in transition (from central planning
towards free market regimes) and typically have fewer national
resources to devote to financing energy efficiency.184 The EU’s
Phare185 program is set up specifically to help Central and Eastern
European countries transition to EU participation, through
strengthening public administration, promoting strong national
legislation, and helping countries achieve EU integration.186
The Phare program has helped to fund a number of innovative
state mechanisms for energy efficiency financing. For example,
Hungary has created an Energy Efficiency Co-financing Scheme,
whereby energy efficiency projects receive loans that they repay
from energy savings, with a grant from Phare used to cover the
interest on the loans.187 Helping Member States to come up with
these types of innovative financing mechanisms is a cost-effective
method of dispensing EU funds in small amounts that make
measurable impacts; this is particularly important given the small
size of the EU budget (less than the budget of the UK alone).188
A recent paper in Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews
suggested that the EU structural funds could play a much larger

latest comprehensive plan for research, and brings together all research-related
EU initiatives under a common program, with the overarching goals of growth,
competitiveness, and employment. See Europa, Seventh Framework Programme:
Understand, http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/understand_en.html. The program
provides grants to qualifying companies, organizations, research centers,
universities, and individuals for research in established areas of interest. See
Europa, Seventh Framework Programme: Who, http://cordis.europa.eu/
fp7/who_en.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2009).
184
KLINCKENBERG CONSULTANTS, supra note 179, at 5.
185
The acronym Phare stands for “Poland and Hungary Assistance for the
Restructuring of the Economy.” See European Parliament, Briefing No. 33, The
Phare Program and the Enlargement of the European Union (Dec. 4, 1998),
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/33a1_en.htm
#summary. It has now expanded to provide assistance to fourteen Central and
Eastern European Countries, including the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Romania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia in addition to Poland and
Hungary. Id. at Annex, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/
briefings/33a3_en.htm.
186
European Union, Phare Programme, http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/
en/lvb/e50004.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2009).
187
KLINCKENBERG CONSULTANTS, supra note 179, at 10.
188
Euractiv, supra note 181.
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role in energy efficiency.189 These funds are the EU’s main
instrument for supporting social and economic development and
reducing inequalities among regions, and amount to between 33
percent and 40 percent of the EU budget, by different estimates.190
While structural funds are not currently used to finance energy
efficiency, they could easily be oriented to this goal or energy
efficiency could be required for all projects applying for support
from the funds.191 The Energy Efficiency Action Plan pledges that
the Commission will encourage the use of structural funds to
“facilitate leveraging of private financing at national and local
levels for energy efficiency.”192
Of direct relevance to developing countries is the recent
creation of a Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy
Fund (GEEREF). This fund is designed to help overcome
investment barriers for sustainable energy in developing countries
and emerging economies by establishing a private-public
partnership for risk sharing and co-financing.193 The goal of the
fund is to attract “patient” risk capital that has a long-term prospect
of return on investment, mostly from banks and financial
intermediaries.194 The fund will initially receive eighty million
euros from the Commission between 2007 and 2010, and a
primary goal will be to direct this funding to investments under ten
million euros, which are often ignored by traditional investors.195
The Commission officially launched the fund in March 2008,196
but it remains to be seen how the fund will fare in attracting

189
See Dalia Streimikiene et al., Use of EU Structural Funds for Sustainable
Energy Development in New EU Member States, 11 RENEWABLE &
SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REVIEWS 1167 (2005).
190
See id. at 1172; Euractiv, supra note 181.
191
See Streimikiene et al., supra note 189, at 1173–74.
192
Action Plan, supra note 30, at 16.
193
European Commission, The Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable
Energy Fund (GEEREF): Key Elements of the European Commission Initiative,
at 1, available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/pdf/key_elements.pdf.
194
Id. at 2.
195
Id.
196
Press Release, New 80 Million Euro Fund to Boost Energy Efficiency and
Renewables in the Fight Against Climate Change in Developing Countries
(March 28, 2008), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleases
Action.do?reference=IP/08/473&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLa
nguage=en.
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private investment in the midst of the global financial crisis that
has developed in 2008.
B. Market Based Instruments
The EU is increasingly turning to market-based instruments to
promote improvements in energy efficiency and environmental
quality. Foremost among these is the EU Emissions Trading
Scheme, discussed supra Part I(C)(6), which creates a market for
carbon emissions allowances. However, it is debatable how much
of an incentive this program creates for energy efficiency
improvements in particular.197 More specifically targeted to
energy efficiency are the white certificates being used by Italy, the
United Kingdom, and France.198 White certificate programs place
an obligation upon energy suppliers to help their customers
implement a certain amount of annual energy savings.199 Each
successful energy efficiency project is awarded white certificates
to represent energy saved, and each supplier must have enough
white certificates (either through implementing projects or through
buying certificates from other suppliers) at the end of each year to
meet its annual energy savings obligation.200 The EU has
expressed a serious interest in white certificates and will consider
whether or not to adopt an EU-wide scheme in the coming
years.201 The advantage of an EU-wide scheme is that a single
market would be more efficient and liquid, eliminating price
differences between countries and mitigating price fluctuations.202
However, the general sentiment of experts both in and outside of
the Commission at the current time seems to be that while white
certificates are a promising option, further development and testing
of such schemes needs to be done to ensure that they are both
effective and cost-effective.203
197

See BERTOLDI ET AL., supra note 78, at 1–5.
EURO WHITECERT PROJECT, WHITE CERTIFICATES: CONCEPT AND MARKET
EXPERIENCES 3 (2007), available at http://www.ewc.polimi.it/documents/
EWC_brochure.pdf.
199
See id.
200
See id. For a comparison of white certificates with the more familiar U.S.
renewable energy credits system, see supra note 109.
201
End-use Energy Directive, supra note 33, art. 4, at 69.
202
Euro WhiteCert Project, supra note 198, at 5.
203
PAOLO BERTOLDI ET AL., WHITE, GREEN, AND BROWN CERTIFICATES: HOW
TO MAKE THE MOST OF THEM?, ECEEE 2005 SUMMER STUDY: WHAT WORKS
198
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C. Supporting Private Financing
The EU is also committed to helping engage more private
financing in the energy efficiency sector.204 One quasi-private
institution that the EU is turning towards for greater investment in
energy efficiency is the European Investment Bank (EIB). The EIB
is jointly owned by the Member States and is a self-financing
institution that focuses its lending efforts based on policy
priorities.205 In the energy field, energy efficiency is one of five
priority areas that the EIB finances. In 2007, the EIB decided to
raise the share of total costs that it will finance for energy
efficiency projects from 50 percent to 75 percent,206 which makes
AND WHO DELIVERS? 1515, 1525 (2005), available at http://www.
ewc.polimi.it/dl.php?file=integration.pdf. In considering a white certificate
scheme, questions are also raised over how a white certificates scheme might
interact with EU climate change policy, and specifically the EU ETS. A 2005
study found that current white certificates policies are unlikely to have a major
impact on overall greenhouse gas emissions, given that utilities are covered by
the EU ETS and would simply sell any credits saved from energy efficiency to
other emitters. David Harrison, Jr. et al, European Commission Directorate
General Environment, Interactions of the EU ETS with Green and White
Certificate Schemes: A Summary for Policy Makers, at 20 (Nov. 17, 2005).
However, white certificates could help lower overall emissions to the extent that
they help lower household fuel consumption (a sector not covered by the EU
ETS). Id. Moreover, the EU could decide to require utilities to retire annually a
number of carbon allowances equal to the amount of carbon emissions avoided
through the white certificates program (instead of allowing utilities to sell these
allowances). This would ensure that white certificates contributed to additional
greenhouse gas reductions on top of the EU ETS, but would raise the cost of the
program as well.
204
Action Plan, supra note 30, at 16.
205
Europa, The European Investment Bank, http://europa.eu/institutions/
financial/eib/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2009). The EIB is a unique
institution: It “is a non-profit, policy driven bank. Unlike commercial banks, the
EIB does not manage personal bank accounts, conduct over-the-counter
transactions or provide private investment advice. The EIB makes long-term
loans for capital investment projects (mainly fixed assets) but does not provide
grants. The EIB is owned by the Member States of the European Union. They
subscribe jointly to its capital, each country’s contribution reflecting its
economic weight within the Union. The EIB does not use any funds from the EU
budget. Instead, it is self-financing, borrowing on the financial markets. Because
the EU Member States are the EIB’s shareholders, it carries the highest possible
credit rating (AAA) on the money markets. As a result, the EIB can raise large
amounts of capital on very competitive terms. As the EIB is not-for-profit, its
lending conditions are equally favourable. . . . The projects the Bank invests in
are carefully selected according to the following criteria: they must help achieve
EU objectives; they must be economically, financially, technically and
environmentally sound; they should help attract other sources of funding.” Id.
206
The European Investment Bank, Renewable Energies and Energy
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these projects feasible for a wider range of potential investors. The
current Energy Efficiency Action Plan commits the Commission to
“call upon the banking sector to offer finance packages specifically
aimed at small and medium enterprises,” specifically through more
public-private partnerships between the private banking sector and
the EIB.207 This goal will likely prove increasingly challenging as
the EU struggles with how to manage a major credit crunch in late
2008.208
In addition, the Commission recognizes the important role that
Energy Service Companies (ESCOs) can play in funding energy
efficiency improvements. ESCOs help design, finance, and
implement energy efficiency projects for energy users and then
share in the energy savings achieved in order to recoup costs and
earn a profit.209 Typical ESCO-run projects include replacement
of inefficient heating and cooling equipment, re-designed lighting,
improvement of industrial processes for energy savings, and
installation of cogeneration.210 The Commission has long been
promoting the ESCO industry,211 and it is expected that the EndEfficiency,
http://www.eib.org/projects/topics/environment/renewable-energy
/index.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2009).
207
Action Plan, supra note 30, at 16.
208
See Managing the Credit Crunch: The European Union’s Week from Hell,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 9, 2008, at 69.
209
See PAOLO BERTOLDI & SILVIA REZESSY, ENERGY SERVICES COMPANIES IN
EUROPE 17–18 (2005), available at http://re.jrc.ec.europa.eu/energyefficiency/
(click on hyperlink for “Publications” and a PDF version of the study is available
under “Reports”). This report does an excellent job of explaining in detail the
financing schemes that are successfully employed by ESCOs and the status of
ESCO development in each Member State, and might prove a good reference if
more specific information on ESCO structure and function is desired. A 2007
update to the report is also available, with more detailed country summaries. See
PAOLO BERTOLDI ET AL., LATEST DEVELOPMENT OF ENERGY SERVICES
COMPANIES ACROSS EUROPE (2007), available at http://www.energy.eu/
publications/LBNA22927ENC_002.pdf.
210
See Paolo Bertoldi, Silvia Rezessy & Edward Vine, Energy Service
Companies in European Countries: Current Status and a Strategy to Foster
Their Development, 34 ENERGY POL’Y 1818, 1823–25 (2006).
211
Specific historical policies are outlined in BERTOLDI & REZESSY, supra
note 209, at 15: “The European Commission has long been promoting the ESCO
industry and TPF” (third party financing) since it first recommended their
promotion to Member States in 1988. “In 1992, the European Council and
Parliament adopted a Directive (93/76/EC), which invited Member States to
design and implement programmes to use TPF in the public sector. Under the
European Commission’s THERMIE and SAVE programs, several studies and
pilot projects were implemented to promote ESCO and TPF activities, mainly in
public buildings and combined heat and power (CHP). In 1996, two standard
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Use Efficiency Directive will further its activities. Specifically, the
directive is designed to facilitate and stimulate more investment in
energy efficiency, and requires Member States to remove barriers
to ESCOs212 and third party financing.213
Unsurprisingly, major differences exist among Member States
in the degree of development of their ESCO industries. On the
whole, the ESCO industry was found to be “in its infancy stage
and . . . struggling to get off the ground” as of 2005, except in
Germany, Austria, Hungary, and France.214 Since then, major
gains have been made in the development of the ESCO industry
across Europe, and particularly in new Member States. But some
countries still lag far behind.215 Major causes of these divergences
include levels of support given by national and regional authorities
and variations in market structures and rules.216 To promote
further use of the ESCO industry across Europe, Commission
experts came up with a number of policy recommendations in their
2005 analysis: increasing dissemination of information about
services offered by ESCOs; launching an accreditation system for
ESCOs to ensure that companies calling themselves ESCOs are
qualified and reliable; developing financing capabilities and
incentives in local markets that allow ESCOs to get off the ground
and become capable of providing their own working capital;
ESCO-type contracts were published—for buildings and for industry—in all the
languages of the EU. In 2002, the European Commission’s GreenLight Program
identified ESCOs operating in the lighting field, and created a preliminary list of
ESCOs . . . . More recently, in 2003, the European Commission DG JRC
conducted a survey of ESCOs in the EU, resulting in the creation of the first
online EU database of ESCOs.”
212
Some common barriers to ESCOs that exist in many Member States are
low awareness and lack of understanding of ESCO services; administrative
services including complicated procedures and high transaction costs, and high
perceived risk and skepticism among ESCO clients (likely closely linked to the
lack of awareness and understanding). See BERTOLDI ET AL., supra note 209, at
85–86.
213
Third party financing is one way in which an ESCO finances energy
efficiency improvements for its customers, by borrowing the necessary capital
from a third party and paying it off gradually through the energy savings
achieved. See generally Directorate-General for Energy & Transport, European
Commission, Third Party Financing of Energy Efficiency in Industry,
Structuring of Pilot Projects in Poland, Austria, Norway and Spain (Dec. 2000),
available at http://www.energyagency.at/publ/pdf/tpfind_en.pdf.
214
BERTOLDI & REZESSY, supra note 209, at 3.
215
See BERTOLDI ET AL., supra note 209, at 79.
216
BERTOLDI & REZESSY, supra note 209, at 3.
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standardizing monitoring and verification of energy savings;
promoting public sector use of ESCO services; and developing a
third-party financing network throughout Europe that would bring
together financial institutions, energy suppliers, and ESCOs to
share best practices and coordinate the effort towards greater
market penetration of ESCOs.217
On the whole, the EU’s energy efficiency financing goals
appear to be two-fold: better targeting of the limited public funding
available to particularly needy and high-yielding projects, and
better harnessing of private incentives as the more realistic source
of most energy efficiency financing for the future. Given some of
the continuing struggles of implementing and enforcing efficiency
laws, pursuing financing as more of a “carrot” strategy as opposed
to the more traditional “stick” strategy will be an important
component of the overall success of energy efficiency
improvements. Hopefully, as the EU works to update and
strengthen its energy efficiency policy and to achieve its Action
Plan, implementation, enforcement, and financing will all continue
to improve. In the meantime, there are a number of lessons to be
drawn from the EU’s experience to date.
V. TRANSFERRING THE LESSONS FROM THE EU TO CHINA
This final section of the note focuses on how the lessons
learned from the EU’s experience in developing, implementing,
and enforcing energy efficiency laws might be transferred to
China. This focus on implementation, enforcement, and financing
is particularly critical in China, where the National People’s
Congress has enacted seemingly strong energy efficiency laws that
are in fact woefully under-implemented and under-enforced at the
local level.218 While the differences between the EU and China in
many respects seem staggering, especially as measured by their
relative stages of economic development and environmental
protection, their institutional structures are in some ways similar
and offer an opportunity to export lessons learned from the EU to
China. The similarities and differences between the EU and China
are highlighted in the first part of this section that focuses on
217

See BERTOLDI ET AL., supra note 209, at 57–60.
See, e.g., Mingyuan, supra note 7, at 227–28 (suggesting that a lack of
implementation and enforcement is critical to the under-success of national
energy efficiency laws).
218
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Chinese laws and institutions. Subsequent subsections detail
recommendations for how China might improve implementation,
enforcement, and financing based on the lessons the EU has
learned in these areas.
A.

Institutions and Law

1.

Institutions
China is unhampered by some of the institutional barriers that
stand in the way of the EU’s ability to formulate comprehensive
energy laws because China is a single nation with power vested in
the National People’s Congress to formulate all “fundamental”
national legislation.219 Recall that the EU’s principle of
subsidiarity constrains the EU from passing detailed, mandatory
measures at the Union-level. China’s ability to pass more specific
commands at the central level could be a major advantage over the
EU’s structure—centralized mandates may in many situations
enhance oversight and create clearer objectives for local
governments to implement. Nevertheless, in practice China’s
central government has devolved much authority to the local level,
placing these governments in primary control of interpreting and
implementing what are often vague, largely aspirational national
laws.220 Provincial governments, and a few municipal
governments, are also given the ability to formulate their own laws
and regulations provided that they do not contravene national
laws.221 Local Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs) are
typically the entities responsible for actually implementing
environmental laws, and are answerable to the national
environmental agency (SEPA, or the State Environmental
Protection Agency).222 But, these EPBs are under the direct
control of their local governments, upon which they rely for
funding, budgets, promotions, and even housing and office

219
Richard J. Ferris, Jr. & Hongjun Zhang, Environmental Law in the
People’s Republic of China, in CHINA’S ENVIRONMENT AND THE CHALLENGE OF
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 66, 69 (Kristen A. Day ed., 2005).
220
Elizabeth Economy, Environmental Enforcement in China, in CHINA’S
ENVIRONMENT AND THE CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 102, 103
(Kristin A. Day. ed., 2005); Sitaraman, supra note 8, at 310.
221
Ferris & Zhang, supra note 219, at 73.
222
Sitaraman, supra note 8, at 309–10.
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space.223 Thus, the loyalty of the EPB is typically primarily to the
local governments, which often are “more interested in promoting
economic growth and increasing industrial production rather than
enforcing SEPA policies that are viewed as anti-growth.”224
The vesting of provinces with implementation and
enforcement responsibility makes China’s law creation and
enforcement mechanisms in practice resemble the EU’s fairly
closely—a central authority passes broad overarching laws, but
lower levels of government are charged with the majority of the
implementation and the enforcement work. Thus, both the EU and
China face the challenge of how to ensure that centrally passed
laws are implemented properly by Member States or provinces
with vastly different geographical and financial situations and
varying levels of commitment to environmental objectives.225
Despite these similarities, the institutions in charge of
implementing national/Union-wide energy efficiency laws in
China and the EU are quite different. In the EU, responsibility is
vested almost entirely within the European Commission’s
Directorate-General for Transportation and Energy (DG-TREN),
with technical research responsibilities shared with the
Commission’s Directorate-General for Research.226 This
arrangement ensures that energy efficiency policy is
contextualized and implemented within overall energy policy, as
DG-TREN is responsible for the entirety of EU Energy Policy.227
In contrast, even at China’s central level alone, one researcher
catalogued eight ministries and eleven departments currently
involved in the formulation of energy policy.228 This split

223

Id.
Id. at 310. See also Mingyuan, supra note 7, at 236–37 (discussing the fact
that many Chinese localities and departments rank energy efficiency very low on
the list of priorities, viewing it as a thankless investment).
225
See Sitaraman, supra note 8, at 309–10.
226
See European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy and Transport,
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy_transport/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 18,
2009);
European
Commission,
Research
Directorate-General,
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/research/index_en.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2009).
227
See Directorate-General for Energy and Transport, supra note 17.
228
Jimin Zhao, Reform of China’s Energy Institutions and Policies:
Historical Evolution and Current Challenges 10–11 (BCSIA Discussion Paper
2001–20, Energy Technology Innovation Project, Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University, 2001), available at http://belfercenter.
ksg.harvard.edu/files/zhao.pdf.
224
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responsibility has reportedly made progress on energy efficiency
laws difficult.229 China’s Energy Conservation Law (ECL) vests
central authority over energy efficiency in the administrative
department for energy conservation under the State Council, but
less clearly calls for “[t]he departments concerned under the State
Council [to] be responsible for energy conservation supervision
and administration within the scope of their respective
functions . . . .”230
The structural similarities but factual differences between
China’s and the EU’s energy efficiency administrations offer
several suggestions for China. As it works to implement its revised
ECL in the coming years, a few lessons that China might draw
from the EU’s experience with its energy efficiency institutions
include:
1. Work to keep the administrative department for energy
conservation from being marginalized. One key factor
that has helped the European Commission prioritize energy
efficiency and achieve significant savings is the fact that
energy efficiency has not been marginalized and has
remained within the purview of the same authorities
responsible for implementing overall energy policy. While
a delegation to a separate administrative department for
energy conservation in China’s central government may be
a necessity, the more this Authority is integrated into the
overall energy policy-making body, the more energy
efficiency is likely to be considered a viable energy supply
option.
2. Consolidate powers. Another institutional lesson that the
EU has to offer is that vesting one agency with
legislative, implementing, and enforcement authority
leads to greater effectiveness and accountability. The
European Commission drafts energy efficiency laws,
oversees their implementation by Member States, and has
full
enforcement
powers.
These
broad-ranging
229

Id. See also ELIZABETH C. ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK: THE
ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE TO CHINA’S FUTURE 103–04 (2004); Mingyuan,
supra note 7, at 229.
230
Energy Conservation Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Nov. 1, 1997, amended Nov. 28, 2007), art. 10 (P.R.C.)
(unofficial translation) (LawInfoChina.com through Nov. 28, 2007 amendment).
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competencies empower the Commission to follow through
on energy efficiency policy from beginning to end, and
enable those tracking implementation to hold a single
agency accountable for successes or failures.
2.

Law
Given China’s relatively high energy intensity (recall that it
uses five times more energy per dollar of GDP than the EU, and
four times more than the US),231 there is an enormous potential for
energy savings. China has recognized this, and in its most recent
five-year plan it has set forth a goal of reducing its energy use per
GDP 20 percent by 2010.232 This goal is incredibly ambitious, and
will depend primarily on reforms in the industrial sector.233
China’s industries consume close to 60 percent of total national
energy demand, and are full of outdated production processes with
low efficiency.234 There is also tremendous potential for efficiency
improvements in buildings, which will be critical as China’s recent
rapid growth has caused general energy demand to rise as more
people can afford larger homes and more electricity-consuming
appliances.235 At least at the national level, China has recognized
the tremendous opportunities presented for energy saving and has
responded with ambitious laws. Current strategies include
numerous labeling laws and regulations,236 building codes,237 and

231

See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, CHINA’S QUEST FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY 1
(Working Paper, June 2006), available at http://www.iea.org/Textbase/
work/2006/gb/papers/ChinaQuest.pdf.
233
Id.
234
WANG YANJIA, ENERGY EFFICIENCY POLICY AND CO2 IN CHINA’S
INDUSTRY:
TAPPING
THE
POTENTIAL
1
(2006),
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/28/36321399.pdf (draft report prepared for the
Annex I Expert Group Seminar in Conjunction with the OECD Global Forum on
Sustainable Development, held on March 27, 2006).
235
JIANG LIN ET AL., LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LABORATORY, ACHIEVING
CHINA’S TARGET FOR ENERGY INTENSITY REDUCTION IN 2010: AN EXPLORATION
OF RECENT TRENDS AND POSSIBLE FUTURE SCENARIOS 22 (2006), available at
http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/china/publications/lbnl-61800.pdf.
236
See, e.g., LIN JIANG ET. AL., OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL
INFORMATION, U. S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, REP. NO. LBNL–50416, ENERGY
EFFICIENT APPLIANCE LABELING IN CHINA: LESSONS FOR SUCCESSFUL LABELING
PROGRAMS IN VARIED MARKETS 4 (2001), available at http://www.osti.gov/
bridge/servlets/purl/823725-8ZjLYT/native/823725.pdf.
237
See LIN ET AL., supra note 235, at 14.
232
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laws targeting industrial efficiency.238 Energy efficiency has been
primarily governed by the Energy Conservation Law since its 1998
passage.239 In 2007, the Chinese government reaffirmed its
commitment to energy efficiency by passing an updated version of
this law240 with stronger regulations for transportation and
construction and improved administrative oversight.241
This note is primarily concerned with how China can better
implement, enforce, and finance its energy efficiency laws as a
whole. Because of this broader focus, this note will not attempt to
describe and catalogue the numerous laws and standards in this
area. While its numerous laws and its ambitious national energy
efficiency targets make it seem as though China has come far in its
energy efficiency policy, the critical challenge for China, with its
powerful central Congress, is not passing ambitious measures.
Rather, implementation and enforcement of these laws will be
paramount to getting these tools to work in China—a revised and
tightened but still largely hortatory ECL will otherwise have little
practical effect.242 Recommendations on how to move from good
laws on paper to good laws in practice is the topic of the following
subsection on implementation.
B. Implementation
The harshest criticism of China’s 1998 Energy Conservation
Law (ECL) is that it has been reduced “to a mere scrap of
paper.”243 Others have asserted more mildly that the law is “based
on clear principles but lack[s] implementation details,” and is
implemented to widely varying degrees among provinces.244
238

See, e.g., YANJIA, supra note 234, at 22–26 (describing several strategies
that China has developed for improving energy efficiency in industry).
239
Id. at 24.
240
Energy Conservation Law, supra note 230, art. 10.
241
See Siobhan Devine, Analysis: China Conservation Doubts Remain,
UNITED PRESS INT’L, Feb. 22, 2008, available at http://www.upi.com/Energy
_Resources/2008/02/22/Analysis_China_conservation_doubts_remain/UPI84921203712077/.
242
See Mingyuan, supra note 7, at 227–28 (suggesting that the goals and aims
of the ECL are far from being achieved, due largely to a lack of implementation
and enforcement). See also Devine, supra note 241 (quoting Barbara Finamore
of NRDC’s China Clean Energy project as explaining that the revised ECL’s
effectiveness “is going to depend on how well it is implemented.”).
243
Mingyuan, supra note 7, at 228.
244
YANJIA, supra note 234, at 2.

WELTON.MACRO.DOC

2009]

8/16/2009 5:02:21 PM

TRANSFERRING EU EXPERIENCES

1473

Commentators seem to agree that there is a serious gap between
the law as written and the law as applied, which is problematic
given that the ECL depends upon “forceful execution of the
supervisory and managerial duties of the government.”245 Key
problems with the ECL include that it is “overly principle-oriented,
lacking, or weak, in terms of enforcement measures;” it imposes
no political supervision or accountability; and it has very vague
and soft language.246 On the whole, one report estimates that “only
6 percent of its articles have been implemented sufficiently, 60
percent have been poorly implemented and 34 percent have not
been implemented at all.”247 Furthermore, implementation varies
widely among provinces and municipalities—whereas Shanghai
has established an effective Energy Conservation Supervision
Center that is locally financed, poorer provinces struggle to create
effective bureaucracies and place energy efficiency low on their
list of priorities.248 One of the reasons for this disparity is that the
national government reportedly gives little guidance on how to
implement its largely hortatory, vague energy efficiency laws.249
The EU is far from perfect in the implementation of its energy
efficiency laws, but its years of practice do provide some
suggestions as to how implementation strategies used in the EU
might be helpful to China:
1. Create more accountability between the ‘layers’ of
government. China, just like the EU, has a multi-layered
institutional structure with territorial divisions at the
centre, province, city, county, township, and village
levels.250 Unlike the EU, though, its energy efficiency
laws leave interpretation to local governments and do not
provide much accountability of local governments to the
central government to ensure implementation and
enforcement.251 Having the national government authority
245

Mingyuan, supra note 7, at 226.
Id. at 231–32; see also YANJIA, supra note 234, at 2.
247
Qingyi, supra note 7, at 97 (citing Wang Qingyi, Ten Issues Regarding
Energy Conservation in China, CHINA ENERGY, No. 5, 17 (2005)).
248
See Mingyuan, supra note 7, at 234 & n.41, 237.
249
Cummings, supra note 4, at 10545.
250
See Sitaraman, supra note 8, at 310.
251
See, e.g., id. at 309–11 (explaining that local EPBs, though nominally
responsible to SEPA, are actually under the almost full control of the local
246
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focus its efforts on monitoring local agencies, rather than
on directly inspecting implementation at the facility level,
would allow more efficient use of limited national
monitoring resources. Similarly, requiring careful reporting
of goals and progress from local government agencies to
the national government would create more accountability
between layers of government.
2. Require (or at least strongly encourage) formulation of
local regulations and bylaws that transform the more
hortatory national laws into concrete local obligations.
The EU’s requirement that all Member States transpose
EU-level directives into national law allows the
Commission to directly track implementation and
interpretation of its EU directives by each Member State.
Given that more than twenty provinces, autonomous
regions, and municipalities have already promulgated up to
seventy bylaws on energy efficiency,252 this same
requirement appears feasible in China, at least with the
proper technical support at the national level.
3. Focus on building institutional capacity and training
individuals in energy efficiency in laggard provinces,
municipalities, and autonomous regions. The EU has
shared the same struggle as China in achieving even
implementation of its energy efficiency laws across
Member States, with many poorer Member States
struggling to create and fund local agencies capable of
ensuring compliance. While the EU is not a paradigm for
dealing with this problem, it has redoubled its efforts to
help bring laggard Member States up to speed. Ways in
which this can be done include training local experts and
providing templates and best practices for the form
that exemplary local bylaws and regulations might
take. This might be modeled on Intelligent Energy
Europe’s “Implementing EU Appliance Policy in Central
and Eastern Europe” Program, discussed supra Part
I(C)(7).

governments and suggesting that this problem is because of a lack of control of
SEPA over local EPBs).
252
Mingyuan, supra note 7, at 234.
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4. Require provinces, autonomous regions, and
municipalities to issue periodic progress reports and
provincial/regional/municipal energy efficiency plans to
the national Energy Conservation Authority. Require
these plans to contain an evaluation of the
implementation of all national energy efficiency laws to
date, progress on any targets set, and a plan for future
concrete steps to achieve these targets. The revised ECL
calls for annual reports from local governments;253 the
more clear the planning and evaluative responsibilities are
for these reports, the more effective they are likely to be.
While not directly imposing any new binding requirements
themselves, these sorts of progress reports have proven
very helpful in allowing the Commission to track
implementation progress in each Member State, reducing
the amount of direct investigatory work that the
Commission must itself perform.
5. Do not use the generalities contained in EU laws as a
drafting guide—formulate complementary rules,
specifications, standards, and guidelines at the national
level that help transform the sometimes vague goals of
the ECL into more concrete obligations where national
uniformity in implementation is a desired goal. Unlike
the EU, China has the constitutional ability to impose
direct, discrete regulatory obligations as part of its national
law.254 For areas where this sort of national uniformity is
desirable, China could far surpass the EU in terms of the
specificity of its laws. This is particularly true in areas that
prove very controversial yet are easy to monitor for
compliance, such as energy taxation laws.
6. Make national technical expertise available to local
authorities for technically complex issues. The EU found
that one of the key reasons that its Buildings Directive had
not been implemented was that there was a lack of
technical expertise at the Member State level to formulate
and implement appropriate national standards. For
implementation problems that are predominantly technical
253

Energy Conservation Law, supra note 230, art. 5.
Hilary K. Josephs, Measuring Progress Under China’s Labor Law: Goals,
Processes, Outcomes, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 373, 377 (2008).
254
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in nature, a small staff of national experts acting as
consultants and trainers could efficiently overcome local
technical hurdles to local implementation.
C. Enforcement
Both the EU and China have struggled and continue to struggle
with enforcement of energy efficiency laws. China’s ECL in
particular has been criticized for failing to provide any real
enforcement mechanisms—the law fails to clearly delegate
implementation or enforcement responsibilities and does not
provide punitive penalties for violations.255 In this respect, the EU
can provide a useful guide through its struggles in getting Member
States to internalize the responsibility for enforcing EU laws. The
EU’s main enforcement leverage has come from building an
intermediary enforcement mechanism into its laws, whereby the
central EU government can take enforcement action against noncompliant Member States. Of course, such an intra-governmental
enforcement mechanism works only to the extent that there is the
political will at the central level to ensure provincial
compliance.256 If China’s central government is in search of
nothing more than lip service to energy efficiency, few
recommendations from the EU will help it move towards stronger
implementation and enforcement.257 However, to the extent that
the central government actually wants to ensure achievement of its
energy efficiency goals and devotes resources to doing so, a few
lessons can be drawn from the EU’s experience that might help
ensure successful enforcement:
255

See Mingyuan, supra note 7, at 233.
One recent article suggests that enforcement challenges stem from a
combination of factors within and without of the central government’s control.
See Adam Briggs, Note, China’s Pollution Victims: Still Seeking a Dependable
Remedy, 18 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 305, 315–16 (2006). To the extent that
enforcement challenges stem from the “imprecise and often over-ambitious texts
of the laws themselves” and a lack of resources at the central government level,
id. at 312, only a more tangible commitment to energy efficiency at the central
level can fix these problems. However, the problem is also largely driven by a
“lack of willingness by self-interested local officials to enforce national laws at
the local level,” id., and the E.U. does have some valuable insights to suggest
ways of coping with this problem.
257
See, e.g., Sitaraman, supra note 8, at 273 (suggesting that one major
problem facing China is “political unwillingness to undertake strong enforcement
measures and prioritize environmental protection ahead of economic growth”
despite a willingness to record strong formal laws).
256
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1. Place concrete obligations directly on lower bodies of
authority (i.e. provincial authorities), not simply on
private entities, to create a direct enforcement chain.
The central authority cannot realistically expect to monitor
compliance and enforce the law against all non-compliant
private entities. Recognizing this, the EU has chosen to
focus its enforcement efforts at the intermediary stage of
Member State obligations.
2. To the extent feasible, create enforcement capabilities
for the national body in charge of enforcing energy
efficiency laws against the local authorities in charge of
implementing the laws. The European Commission’s
ability to bring Member States to the European Court of
Justice has proven a powerful negotiating tool, enabling
the Commission informally to ensure Member State
compliance with the laws in almost all cases. A similar
ability to take enforcement action against non-compliant
provinces and to use the threat of such actions as a
bargaining tool would empower much more intragovernmental enforcement authority between national and
local administrators. Including implementation timelines
within energy efficiency laws has enabled the EU to be
particularly successful in tracking implementation at the
Member State level and in bringing enforcement actions
against those countries lagging behind in implementation.
3. Enforcement power works best when it is not confined
to the national government and local authorities;
legitimate private enforcement rights will ultimately be
the most effective enforcement tool. The EU has
struggled tremendously to actually achieve on-the-ground
implementation of its energy efficiency laws—while the
Commission takes action against Member States failing in
their major obligations, it simply does not have the
enforcement capabilities (and some argue, nor should it) to
monitor local action on the ground across the EU. The EU
has no good model to offer of private enforcement rights
for energy efficiency, given that it chose not to create a
direct right for private enforcement within its laws, and the
ability to enforce these directives in national court absent a
direct right is questionable. However, the EU’s experience
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does suggest that fostering greater individual enforcement
by the public will be a critical component of achieving
more robust enforcement of energy efficiency laws.
Admittedly, the possibility of private rights of
enforcement, namely through citizen suits, is still remote in
China. However, a few environmental attorneys are
experimenting with bringing suits and interest is growing
in the use of the mechanism.258 While not a likely major
avenue for near-term enforcement, many believe that the
US’s success with citizen suits (and, conversely, the EU’s
struggles in the absence of such suits) does offer valuable
lessons to China in terms of future enforcement
possibilities.259
D. Financing
Financing is often the critical hurdle for cost-effective energy
efficiency projects actually getting off the ground—while it seems
counterintuitive that cost-effective projects would not be
implemented, the up-front costs and long payback times make a
solid financing scheme an essential part of any energy efficiency
strategy. The EU is still in the process of developing good energy
efficiency financing practices, but is far enough along in
experimenting with various options that it offers some good
financing lessons:
1. Target funds where they are most needed. Help
empower poorer provinces and smaller projects to take
advantage of international funding opportunities. The
EU has recognized that it has countries with extremely
divergent financing capabilities, and has increasingly
targeted its aid towards those Member States most in need
of assistance. Particularly for China, there is a large
amount of international funding available for financing
258

See Patti Goldman, Public Interest Environmental Litigation in China:
Lessons Learned from the U.S. Experience, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 251, 253 (2007);
Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Twenty-First Century, 25 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 1, 24 (2007).
259
See Briggs, supra note 256, 325–26; Barbara Finamore, Maria McFarland
& Wallace Showman, The Unprotected Environment: Case Studies Illustrating
the Need for New Solutions, 15 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 428, 435 (2004);
Percival, supra note 258, at 24–25.
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projects, but reports suggest that those municipalities most
successful at obtaining international funds are the most
environmentally conscious and active cities (Shanghai,
Zhongshan, Dalian) that already have strong ties with the
international community.260 As the EU has done, China
might choose to target domestic aid towards poorer
provinces and to help these provinces improve their ability
to obtain international funding.
2. Stretch relatively little public money to cover a large
number of projects by using it innovatively. The EU’s
Phare Program’s co-financing scheme, whereby public
money covers only the interest that an energy efficiency
project would otherwise pay, offers one model for
effectively using relatively small amounts of public
funding.261
3. Encourage the development of ESCOs by dialoguing
with them about policy barriers262 that exist to their
ideal functioning. The EU has been increasingly
successful in helping ESCOs to succeed, largely through
surveying existing companies and addressing their policy
concerns. China, in its preliminary stages of ESCO
development,263 could similarly help to remove some of
the key barriers to entry that its early ESCOs have
experienced. The revised ECL “encourages” the
development of ESCOs,264 but more concrete measures
may be needed to help these entities enter the market. For
example, the EU has found that subsidies, dissemination of
information and capacity building, national accreditation of
ESCOs to enhance their credibility, and helping ESCOs

260

ECONOMY, supra note 229, at 120.
This project is discussed in more detail supra Part IV(A).
262
Some of the key barriers identified in the EU through surveying ESCOs
include low awareness and lack of information about ESCOs, client skepticism,
high perceived risk, high administrative hurdles and transaction costs, split
incentives, and availability of financing. See BERTOLDI ET AL., supra note 209, at
85–86. The barriers in China may prove to be similar to these, but a survey of
existing ESCOs in China could more reliably pinpoint the precise challenges
confronted there.
263
YANJIA, supra note 234, at 39.
264
Energy Conservation Law, supra note 230, art. 22.
261
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acquire third-party financing have all contributed to the
growing success of ESCOs in the EU.265
4. Require energy efficiency to be a component of any
national government-funded project. While the EU has
not built this requirement into its allocation of Structural
Funds, experts suggest that this would be an excellent way
to make energy efficiency more of a priority in EU-funded
actions.266
5. Better align energy prices with energy costs. The EU has
struggled with implementing minimum energy taxes, but
has found more support from Member States for marketsignaling options such as real time pricing. Any steps that
can be taken to have energy prices better reflect the true
cost of energy consumption will help promote further
energy efficiency. China might also carefully monitor the
EU’s upcoming deliberations on whether to use white
certificates for energy efficiency, though it probably should
not yet opt in to this nascent market mechanism.267
CONCLUSION
Both China and the EU have a long way to go in achieving
complete implementation of their laudable energy efficiency goals.
However, in its first fifteen years of implementing energy
efficiency policy, the EU has made impressive improvements and
developed increasingly effective implementation, enforcement,
and financing strategies. As China’s demand for energy burgeons
over the next few decades, any and all steps that it can take to
make energy efficiency a major part of its energy supply mix will
have positive impacts on its environment and economy. Moreover,
given that China is expected to account for 20 percent of the
increased global energy demand and half the increased demand in
265

See BERTOLDI ET AL., supra note 209, at 87–89.
See, e.g., Streimikiene et al., supra note 189, at 1174.
267
This is both because the white certificate is a nascent, unproven market
mechanism just gaining traction in Europe and not yet experimented with on a
large scale, and because China probably still lacks the institutional capacity to
run a white certificate program. See generally Ruth Greenspan Bell, What to Do
About Climate Change, FOREIGN AFF., May–June 2006, at 105, 112 (arguing that
countries like China are not ready to implement Western economic tools like
emissions trading—and by extension, white certificates—until assistance is
provided “to build effective monitoring, inspection, and enforcement practices”).
266
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coal over the next thirty years,268 any improvements in its energy
efficiency will have important effects on global energy supply and
prices and worldwide levels of greenhouse gas emissions. But, the
devil is in the details—the real challenge for both the EU and
China is in transforming what they have already realized are
excellent policy goals into fully implemented solutions across all
levels of government. This note’s goal has been to discuss some
of the details that have plagued the EU and, by identifying these
problems and any solutions that have been found, help China
‘leap-frog’ some of the challenges that the EU has encountered.269
These lessons that EU has learned in implementing, enforcing, and
financing its energy efficiency policy have the potential to help
China move from broad national goals to concrete local
implementation more quickly and effectively.

268

ANGIE AUSTIN, ENERGY AND POWER IN CHINA: DOMESTIC REGULATION
FOREIGN POL’Y 5 (Foreign Pol’y Ctr. 2005), available at
http://fpc.org.uk/publications/153 (citing IEA statistics).
269
Cf. Cummings, supra note 4, at 10526.
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